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Captain, USAF

Approved:

/signed/
Michael J. Mendenhall, Maj, PhD
(Chairman)
/signed/
Barry E. Mullins, PhD
(Member)
/signed/
Gilbert L. Peterson, PhD
(Member)

5 March 2009
date

5 March 2009
date

5 March 2009
date

AFIT/GCE/ENG/09-02

Abstract
Identification of cyber attacks and network services is a robust field of study
in the machine learning community. Less effort has been focused on understanding
the domain space of real network data in identifying important features for cyber
attack and network service classification. Motivations for such work allow for anomaly
detection systems with less requirements on data “sniffed” off the network, extraction
of features from the traffic, reduced learning time of algorithms, and ideally increased
classification performance of anomalous behavior.
This thesis evaluates the usefulness of a good feature subset for the general
classification task of identifying cyber attacks and network services. The generality
of the selected features elucidates the relevance or irrelevance of the feature set for
the classification task of intrusion detection. Additionally, the thesis provides an
extension to the Bhattacharyya method, which selects features by means of inter-class
separability (Bhattacharyya coefficient). The extension for multiple class problems
selects a minimal set of features with the best separability across all class pairs.
Several feature selection algorithms (e.g., accuracy rate with genetic algorithm,
RELIEF-F, GRLVQI, median Bhattacharyya and minimum surface Bhattacharyya
methods) create feature subsets that describe the decision boundary for intrusion
detection problems. The selected feature subsets maintain or improve the classification performance for at least three out of the four anomaly detectors (i.e., classifiers)
under test. The feature subsets, which illustrate generality for the intrusion detection problem, range in size from 12 to 27 features. The original feature set consists
of 248 features. Of the feature subsets demonstrating generality, the extension to
the Bhattacharyya method generates the second smallest feature subset. This thesis quantitatively demonstrates that a relatively small feature set may be used for
intrusion detection with machine learning classifiers.
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Numerical Analysis for Relevant Features
in Intrusion Detection
(NARFid)

I. Introduction
The new United States (US) Air Force mission statement expands the Air
Force’s role from the physical domains of air and space to include cyberspace. The
adoption of computer networking as part of this mission domain highlights the dependencies of the US’ physical war-making capabilities, national infrastructure, and
economy on computer systems and communication technologies. The US national
infrastructure and defense systems are placed at risk due to the low cost and minimal
knowledge required to cause harm in the cyberspace domain. The ability to recognize
threats is critical to the US Air Force’s ability to find, fix, track, target and engage
in cyberspace.
1.1

Background
The United States heavily relies on information technologies in the private and

public sectors to maximize effectiveness through automation, communication, situational awareness, and decision support. The loss or degraded operation of commercial
and government services due to cyber attacks could cause havoc on productivity, overall performance and safety, if critical infrastructures are affected. Entrenched usage
of information technologies is core to the business community, the government, and
a way of life for many. Even though the commercial sector has pushed hard for network and computer security improvements over the past decade, a virtual “arms race”
between unethical hackers and security professionals has resulted with no expected
end to the exploit cycle [79]. Without flawless systems with absolute security, novel
methods of detecting and responding to attacks are required.
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1.1.1 National Cyberspace Security Strategy.

The importance of cyberspace

and information technologies illicits planning at all levels of government. At the highest level, the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace [53] provides a framework to
deter, prevent and respond to threats covering the physical and logical cyber infrastructure. The strategy emphasizes the need for cooperation among US government,
other public entities, private institutions, international organizations, and governments to secure cyberspace. The Department of Homeland Security has a central role
in facilitating this national strategy. The Department of Defense’s (DoD’s) role is to
secure the defense industrial base, quickly attribute the source of cyber attacks, and
develop capabilities to prevent attacks from reaching critical systems and infrastructures.
A foundational principle in deterring attacks in cyberspace is removing anonymity
from the offender and holding them accountable. The Internet and most common operating systems were developed as open systems. Cyber attack techniques highlight
these characteristics by obfuscating their origins so the source of a packet is not necessarily the source of the attack. The botnet used against Estonia is a prime example,
where attacks came from all over world [65]. No state or other actor claimed responsibility or was deemed culpable. Implementing a secure cyberspace with accountability
will require a concerted effort in research and development of software and operating systems, and security-oriented standard development. The National Strategy to
Secure Cyberspace addresses all of these areas and relies heavily on market forces to
correct these issues along with government research and development.
1.1.2 Network Centric Warfare.

Communication systems reside at the heart

of the United States warfighting capability and ability to implement network centric
warfare. The DoD strongly pursues the concept of network centric warfare since a
“networked force” has been identified as a decisive factor to success [52]. The DoD
intends to accelerate processes and provide data integration for seamless operations
by optimizing members’ capabilities with information technologies. The concept pro-
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Figure 1.1:

Joint Tactical Radio System Network: Denotes the extensive integration of DOD systems with network communication capabilities

vides an increased warfighting advantage through information sharing of situational
awareness and commander’s decisions. The warfighter then benefits from the speed of
command, and increased lethality and survivability. The network centric operations
concept will accelerate the deployment of networked forces and capabilities placing
an even heavier burden on the DoD’s communication systems. Network centric operations blanket the operational environment and are entwined with operation systems.
For example, Figure 1.1 depicts the planned Joint Tactical Radio System, which will
integrate operational and tactical systems to the DoD’s Global Information Grid.
Extensive developmental and operational test are performed on warfighting systems
to mitigate vulnerabilities and operational flaws. Even so, the military’s unclassified
and classified network must be monitored for threats.
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1.2

Problem Statement
Identification of cyber attacks and network services is a robust field of study in

the machine learning community [1,2,5,11,18,20–23,25,27,39,42,44,45,48,49,54,58–
62, 64, 66, 72, 77, 80, 81, 85]. Less effort has been focused on understanding the domain
space of real network data to identify important features for cyber attack and network
service classification. Motivations for identifying the most relevant features allows for
anomaly detection systems with fewer requirements on data “sniffed” off the network,
extraction of features from the traffic, reduced learning time of algorithms, and ideally
increased performance in accuracy.
For the purpose of intrustion detection, this thesis seeks to minimize the number
of features while obtaining statistically-significant improvement in classification, and
decipher the relationships and traits of the selected feature subsets. Feature selection
of a high dimensional data may allow for improvement of a classifier’s generalizability and comprehensibility, and data simplicity [46]. Generalizability of a classifier
provides the ability of a classifier to model the data for the sake of improving classification accuracy. Predictive accuracy (or error) is often the metric for assessing
generalizability; the higher the accuracy the greater the performance of the model on
unseen data. Comprehensibility of a classifier entails understanding the relationships
within data that support accurate classification. The simpler the model, the easier
it is to understand the relationships generated between the features. Data simplicity
pertains to the number of features and potential samples. In real world scenarios,
features are often real numbers resulting in an infinite number of possible samples.
In a contrived scenario provide by Liu and Motoda [46], one may have a maximum of
two binary features that results in only four possible samples. Dimensionality reduction by selecting a subset of features and a discretization of the features provides for
simpler models that require less learning and improved accuracy.
This thesis evaluates the usefulness of a good feature subset for the general
classification task of identifying cyber attacks and network services. The generality
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of the selected features elucidates the relevance or irrelevance of the feature set for
the classification task [46]. Feature selection utilizing a single classifier for verification
may lead to a feature subset that only performs well for the implemented classifier.
Classification performance across a varied group of classifiers demonstrates that the
feature subset provides inherent classification advantage vice preferring the bias of a
single classifier.
1.3

Scope
This research focuses on the ability to find cyber attacks over a network. Cur-

rent methods for intrusion detection systems analyze network traffic predominantly
by signature-based and policy-based methods. Current research of anomaly-based
methods assesses various machine learning techniques in clustering and classifying
network traffic. This thesis places a greater focus on developing and validating the
features (e.g., statistics, metrics or other measures) of network traffic used to describe
a network flow for identifying cyber attacks. The feature sets may be further optimized by determining a minimal set for clustering and classification. The thesis
will pursue machine learning approaches to analyzing network traffic for the purpose
of detecting anomalous behavior with network traffic. Machine learning is used in
selecting, validating and decreasing the dimensionality of relevant features.
1.4

Organization
The following chapters discuss areas of machine learning and their application

to the problem of intrusion detection by seeking a useful set of features to describe
the decision boundary. Chapter II delves into the established research in the area of
intrusion detection, classification methods and feature selection algorithms. Chapter III outlines a methodology for assessing useful features for the intrusion detection
problem and recommends an extension to a current feature selection method. Chapter IV provides results of the experiments and analysis of why certain features may
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be beneficial. Chapter V summarizes this thesis’ effort, details the contribution of
this work, and recommends future work.
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II. Background
Research in the area of intrusion detection appears to be in two “camps.” The first
camp revalidates established results for the classification of network traffic, with little
apparent extension to the field of study. For example, several works demonstrate
the effectiveness of the multilayer perceptron to classify traffic types from monitored
traffic [11, 22, 25, 44, 62, 64]. A majority of whom utilize the same data sets developed
by a Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) study [27, 45]. Analysis
of well performing classifiers for a given application is certainly warranted; there are
numerous extensions to the multilayer perceptron in regards to intrusion detection
(e.g., string handling and layered approaches [23, 49]). Redundant and gratuitous
works, which profess similar conclusions, serve little utility in extending the current
body of knowledge.
The second camp of research assesses novel methods in developing a framework
for anomaly detection. It is this body of work that this thesis intends to extend by assessing relevant features for inclusion in an intrusion detection system. The Network
and Operating Systems group at the University of Cambridge addresses important
facets to the intrusion detection system. A key component from a research perspective is data for experimentation. The University of Cambridge group has developed
a broad feature set as well as a test suite (see Section 4.1.1). Additionally, the group
addresses multiple components of the intrusion detection system to include monitoring of data and detection methods [2, 58, 60]. The monitoring system is capable
of examining network traffic at gigabit speeds and extracting features pertinent to
classification off-line. The group has demonstrated extensions to established classification methods for intrusion detection, (e.g., multilayer perceptron and Näive Bayes
classifiers), which is discussed further in Section 2.2.2. An area lacking is analysis of
the features relevant to the intrusion detection problem. Identification of a relevant
feature subset allows for the possible online extraction of those features for (near)
real-time classification. This chapter continues by discussing the generic framework
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of intrusion detection and pertinent work in the field of machine learning for anomaly
detection and feature selection.
2.1

Intrusion Detection
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) serve as a defensive tool against cyber at-

tacks on a network, host, or application. A network-based IDS monitors network
traffic over a single or multiple network nodes. A host-based IDS monitors a given
machine’s operating system, software, and files. An application-based IDS monitors a
specific application-level system such as a database or accounting system. The basic
framework of a typical IDS is illustrated by Figure 2.1. A given system is monitored
and data is extracted for real-time or post analysis with an IDS. The core function
of the IDS identifies malicious behavior within the monitored system or network.
Pending on the IDS type, responses may vary from blocking ports, quarantining files,
or revoking user access. The malicious behavior may have an internal or external
source. An internal bad actor is a legitimate user or process performing a disallowed
operation. An unauthorized user or process gaining access and executing commands
constitutes an external bad actor. Data gathering methodologies, detection engines,
and responses may function irrespective of source or be tailored to address a given
system threat. As discussed, an IDS contains several components, but much of the
difficulty resides in the central component, the detector. There are two methodologies
for implementing a detector within an IDS: anomaly and signature detection.
Anomaly detection annotates outliers, often termed abnormal, from all traffic.
The identified outliers are expected to be indicative of malicious traffic. This methodology is stigmatized with having large false alarm rates [3, 39]. In general, anomaly
detection may be implemented via various methods like agents, expert systems and
machine learning techniques. This research address methods for feature selection and
classification pertinent to anomaly detection. These methods are directly applicable
to other domains that contain high dimensional data requiring classification, regres-
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Figure 2.1:

This is an architecture of a typical intrusion detection system from [40]

sion, or clustering. Previous work on the techniques and challenges for network traffic
classification are discussed in Section 2.2.
Signature detection (commonly known as misuse detection) may utilize pattern
matching techniques and/or rule-based models to compare observed traffic with an
established “library” of known attacks. It provides a high confidence in detection
since the attacks are known and described in detail in a library. Issues arise with
these types of systems due to the lag in adding new signatures to a given library or
missed variations of known attacks.
Although both methodologies fundamentally support the same capability, the
two techniques address the problem of intrusion detection from opposite angles.
Signature-based detection uses the attributes of all possible (known) attacks to find
an attack. Where anomaly-based detection baselines the operation of the system (to
include network) and determines attacks based on variations from the baseline. This
description makes certain assumptions to imply the effectiveness of a given approach.
Signature-based detection requires knowledge of all possible attacks to always be suc-
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cessful and anomaly-based detection requires in-depth knowledge of how a system is
suppose to “behave.” How to define the behavior of a system has significant complexity. A signature-based approach relies on maintaining an up-to-date file of the
malicious software. Anomaly-based detection relies on updates of “appropriate” behavior of the system to assess changes and recognize the actions of malicious software.
The output of a signature-based system is deterministic. A given file or collection of
network traffic must match a signature of malicious code to illicit a detection. Many
anomaly-based detection methods utilize stochastic or statistical approaches. The
detection bases its conclusion on probabilistic evidence of whether a behavior is malicious or not, which may require further assessment. Since anomaly detection is not
limited to a set of identified malicious code, it will have the capability to find new
cyber attacks with a degree of certainty (or uncertainty pending your perspective).
2.2

Related Work
There is a large body of research into the use of machine learning algorithms

for traffic classification and identification of network attacks for anomaly detection.
Traditionally, well-known port numbers are used to distinguish types of network traffic. Of course, this approach is not feasible for cyber attacks, but many applications
obscure their high-level application by using a well-known port of an alternate application. This is common among peer-to-peer networks. Vice solely relying on port
numbers, supervised and unsupervised techniques utilize statistical trends among like
flows to perform classification or clustering. Claffy and Paxson [15, 67] illustrate
the separation of network traffic volume distributions and transmitted byte statistics
that make machine learning techniques plausible from data collected with a network
“sniffer.” Specifically, flow duration and packet volume distinguished Domain Name
System packets from other types for network traffic.
2.2.1 Feature Selection.

Dash and Liu define feature selection as selecting

the minimally sized subset of features, which does not significantly reduce classifica-
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tion accuracy and maintains the original class distribution given all of the features [17].
The adoption of a large number of “ad hoc” features for real-world classification problems is to be expected, since an adequate understanding of the domain is unlikely.
Features may be redundant, uninformative, or even distractors for a given application. Features may have no relevance alone, but together with other features they may
provide synergies for significant performance gains [26]. An ideal classification process would involve only relevant features to minimize running time, improve learning
performance, and illustrate understanding of the specific classification problem.
Feature selection is an intractable, exponentially hard, O(2N ), search problem
where N is the number of features and 2N − 1 is the number of feature subsets,
ignoring the null set, to be searched for determining optimal performance [47]. The
number of combinations with k elements drawn from a set of n elements [57] may be
calculated with
 
n!
n
.
=
k!(n − k)!
k

(2.1)

The number of subset combinations to be searched is proved with the binomial theorem, when x and y are equal to 1, as follows:
n

(x + y) =

n  
X
n
k=0

n

(1 + 1) =

n  
X
n
k=0

n

2 =

k

k

xn−k y k

1n−k 1k

n  
X
n
k=0

k

.

(2.2)

By ignoring the null set (k = 0), the precise search space may be calculated:
n

2 =

n  
X
n
k=1

k

 
n
+
0

n  
X
n
.
2 −1=
k
k=1
n
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(2.3)

There are two major components to the optimization task of feature subset selection for classification, as with other optimization problems [17]. First, a generation
method traverses subsets utilizing tree-based, stochastic, or other search methods.
Second, an evaluation measure estimates the (expected) performance of a given subset.
Generation methods are search methods of the feature subset space. In choosing
a search method, one would want a complete search that is guaranteed a solution (e.g.,
breadth-first search). Whether the solution is optimal or not for a given evaluation
measure would be beneficial. Search methods take advantage of costs, heuristics
and stochasticity in pruning the space. Running times are significantly less than if
one performs an exhaustive search of every possible combination. Evaluating features
individually or using a heuristic reduces the search problem time complexity to O(N 2 )
or less [17]. For example, a heuristic may be used to reduce the search space by
greedily selecting features so the space is reduced by one each iteration. In this case,
the search space is O(N 2 ) since the number of features to search goes from N to
one and is calculated by N + ... + 2 + 1 = N (N − 1)/2. Additionally, the use of a
classifier for determining the evaluation measure would hinder the running time by
the complexity of the classification technique, which may be significant for iterative
methods.
Evaluation measures provide a cost for the performance optimization of a feature
or feature subset in classification. Measures are based on distance, information theory,
dependency, consistency, or classifier accuracy rate. Distance, information theory, dependency, and consistency measures allow for broad application of a selected feature
set since the algorithms depend on intrinsic characteristics and relationships of the
features, including class label at times [17]. Utilizing classification as the evaluation
measure provides a direct performance measure of the pertinent task on a representative test set. Without assessing the actual performance of the feature subset, one
would not be able to determine any synergies from grouping certain subsets of fea-

2-6

tures together. It is not necessarily true that the best-performing feature set for a
given classifier is universally useful for all classification techniques.
Blum and Langley [7] categorize feature selection methods into three camps:
embedded, filter, and wrapper. An embedded method performs feature selection
as part of a learning algorithm. A filter method removes irrelevant features utilizing
internal characteristics of the features, vice an external learning algorithm to quantify
performance. Lastly, a wrapper method utilizes a learning algorithm to evaluate
subsets in the search space. Feature selection methods may contain characteristics of
multiple groupings in Blum’s [7] and/or Dash’s [17] taxonomy.
Specifically for the intrusion detection problem, Lunt [48] attests to the lack
of a priori knowledge on the effectiveness of a given set of features for classification.
For some classifiers like Näive Bayes, redundant and irrelevant features chosen due to
intuition may significantly encumber network traffic classification performance [60].
Predominantly, discussion of feature selection algorithms for the purpose of intrusion
detection focus on increasing the performance of a given classifier with a reduced
subset [13, 14, 80]. For example, Auld [2] and Zainal [89] compare the constituents of
selected subsets on differing data sets to illustrate consistency among selected features.
They demonstrate high classification rates after feature selection of characteristic
discriminators that do not include reliance on port numbers. On the other hand,
Moore [60] discusses the separation between classes in feature space as an important
feature characteristic for classification. To illustrate the point, Figure 2.2 shows a
high degree of separability among attack and WWW Transmission Control Protocol
(TCP) connections using the mean bytes in an Ethernet packet (feature 177 from
the experimental data set discussed in Section 4.1.1) as a descriptor of the TCP
connection.
2.2.1.1 Bhattacharyya Method.

Utschick [84] discusses feature selec-

tion based on the separability between classes for a given feature for a multiple-class
classification problem. The Bhattacharyya coefficient is used as a measure of the sep-
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Figure 2.2:

The plot illustrates histograms of feature 177 from the perspective of
two classes. The histograms demonstrate the separability between attack and WWW traffic

arability of two classes, a and b, for a given feature f . The Bhattacharyya coefficient
for a given feature, Bf , is calculated by

Bf =

k q
X

pai pbi ,

(2.4)

i

where there are k bins of the data, and pi represents the probability (or contribution)
of a bin in a feature’s histogram in respect to samples of a given class, a or b. The
Bhattacharyya coefficient ranges from [0,1], where a value of one indicates that the
two distributions are identical and zero indicates absolutely no overlap of the distributions. The mean Bhattacharyya coefficient is used as the measure for comparing
features among multiple classes, where there are C(C −1)/2 possible pairs of C classes
and the smallest mean is the most important feature. Sorting by the mean is analogous to sorting by the median Bhattacharyya coefficient, since both represent differing
perspectives of the “center” of a sample set. Correlation is shown between the predictive accuracy of a classifier and the Bhattacharyya coefficient of the features used in
training. Feature selection by way of mean Bhattacharyya coefficient is extended by
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Benediktsson [4] to consider feature selection based on a weighted average of separability if one seeks to optimize the classifier for a given class or set of classes. Utschick
and Benediktsson [4,84] assume the distributions of the features among the classes are
Gaussian in order to utilize the Bhattacharyya coefficient. Thacher, et al. [82] show
the Gaussian assumption need not be made; the Bhattacharyya coefficient may be
used as a measure for a data set with any distribution of the features. Additionally,
Thacher argues that the Bhattacharyya coefficient is an absolute similarity metric,
vice a measure of relative separation.
Utilizing the Bhattacharyya coefficient results in a O(S) runtime in respect to
the number of samples (S). This is due to the fact that there is a constant number
of passes through all the data for the sake of generating counts and binning the class
histogram of the feature. The runtime in respect to the number of features (N ) would
still be O(N logN ) due to the sorting of the features by Bhattacharyya value. For the
purposes of this thesis, this feature selection approach is referred to as the mean or
median Bhattacharyya method. The runtime performance for this method is on the
low end in comparison to the other feature selection methods discussed. The sorting
of features by the mean Bhattacharyya coefficient does not contribute to the worst
case runtime performance as long as the number of samples is significantly greater
than the number of features.
2.2.2 Classification.

Laskov [42] shows that supervised algorithms greatly

outperform unsupervised algorithms for “known” attacks. For “unknown” attacks,
both techniques perform equally poor. Performance of the unsupervised algorithms
are consistently below 80% accuracy. For supervised learning, Laskov defines an attack as “known” if it exists in the test and training sets and “unknown” if it exists
only in the test set. Unsupervised algorithms are not typically trained with class label
information so only the test sets are used. There is a clear advantage for favoring
supervised learning algorithms for this application. However, the effort required in
labeling data and the uncertainty in the true label for training makes supervised tech-
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niques laborious and potentially unreliable. Extensive preparation of training data
may be necessary to accurately portray the classification of network flows. A reliable
mechanism of clustering network flows for classification would provide a step in the
direction for automated training of a supervised classification method. Unsupervised
clustering algorithms are successfully adapted as classifiers with some papers reporting accuracies in the 80 - 90% range [5, 20, 90]. This thesis deals with supervised
learning techniques for the purpose of feature selection.
The multilayer perceptron with backpropagation (BP) provides the capability to
analyze traffic in a non-linear construct and handle incomplete or noisy data. These
characteristics are directly applicable to a real computer network, which will have
failures, lost packets, and complex relations among flow statistics and a flow’s behavior. Furthermore, the feedforward through a BP for classification is extremely
fast and of benefit for this application with massive volumes of flows. As more information on a specific site’s traffic is known, a BP may be retrained to provide
increased accuracy. Of most interest, BPs may correctly identify previously unseen
attacks, where a signature-based method would not. BPs relax the need for accurate
modeling of statistical distributions of a given metric. Furthermore, BPs have the
advantage of learning and performing well with a host of features, which may not be
important to the task, by minimizing their contribution to reduce error. Numerous
works [2, 11, 18, 22, 25, 44, 62, 64, 81] demonstrate the effectiveness of BPs on the classification task to identity network services and cyber attacks. A majority of which
succeed at detection rates of 90% with some reaching an unbiased estimate of 99%.
Despite its success, the BP has its share of problems. Training a BP often
requires a significant amount of data to provide adequate representation of the domain.
Unlike signature-based methods that use expert systems and rule-based approaches, a
BP serves as a “black box” and does not provide an intuitive or meaningful structure
for imparting the knowledge learned aside from the achieved output [31]. Additionally,
a BP biases the output classification to a given class if it constitutes a significantly
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large portion of the training set. A BP learns the given class with more training steps
than alternate classes causing the bias [2].
The Näive Bayes classifier with Gaussian distribution is another common classification model used for exploring the problem of identifying network services and
cyber attacks. Moore and John [33, 60] illustrates the classification potential of a
variant of the Näive Bayes classifier utilizing kernels, while highlighting the deficiency
of the algorithm’s assumption. For complex data sets, the features are likely not
independent. When modeling the distribution of the features utilizing kernels, the
classification performance is significantly increased compared to using a Näive Bayes
classifier assuming a Gaussian distribution. This may be explained by features with
multi-modal distributions. Nguyen [66] demonstrates the capacity of the Näive Bayes
classifier to statistically model flows and identify network services with a sliding window. The sliding window only captures a portion of the flow so classification occurs
with missing data and accounts for real-time changes in traffic over a network. Specific to intrusion detection, the Näive Bayes classifier provides ample classification
performance even with a small set of features in detecting Internet worms [1].
2.3

Machine Learning Algorithms
This section discusses methods for classification and feature selection, which are

further investigated in this work. Most methods exclusively function as a classification
or feature selection algorithm. Two algorithms, C4.5 decision tree with pruning and
Generalized Relevance Learning Vector Quantization Improved (GRLVQI), perform
both functions in the development of the classifier. The classification algorithms
consist of the following:
1. C4.5 Decision Tree
2. Näive Bayes Classifier
3. Multilayer Perceptron with backpropagation (BP)
4. Generalized Relevance Learning Vector Quantization Improved (GRLVQI)
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C4.5 decision tree develops a decision tree that segments the domain space based
on entropy-derived feature values. The Näive Bayes classifier, in this thesis, models
classes as joint probability distribution functions (PDFs) as the product of Gaussian
distributions. Each dimension is assumed Gaussian and independent. The estimates
of the joint PDFs, the likelihood of the class, and a maximum likelihood are used in
the classification process. The BP utilizes a directed graph that performs a nonlinear
combination of the features to model a class. Lastly, GRLVQI uses prototype vectors
to represent the boundary of the modeled classes.
This research delves into various feature selection algorithms in assessing a working set of features for intrusion detection. All of these algorithms are capable of handling continuous, discrete and nominal data and capable of dealing with large data
sets [17]. The possible combinations of feature selection generation and measures are
substantial. This survey of feature selection methods covers the following algorithms:
1. RELIEF-F
2. Probability of Error and Average Correlation Coefficient (POEACC)
3. Decision Tree Method
4. Generalized Relevance Learning Vector Quantization Improved (GRLVQI)
5. Classifier Accuracy Rate and various search methods
RELIEF-F provides a feature specific weighting based on a distance within the
given dimension. Probability of Error and Average Correlation Coefficient provides
a feature specific ranking based on dependency and classifier performance of a given
feature. The Decision Tree Method utilizes the C4.5 decision tree with pruning to
generate a subset based on information theory and probability of error. GRLVQI
utilizes a distance-based approach for a feature relevance, which is iteratively updated
with each training step of generating the classifier. The final feature selection methods
utilize the classifier accuracy rate evaluation measure with a genetic algorithm and
best first search to find a well performing feature subset.
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Client Port (2) <= 20: FTP-DATA
Client Port (2) > 20
|
Server Port (1) <= 53
|
|
Server Port (1) <= 23
|
|
|
Server Port (1) <= 21: FTP-CONTROL
|
|
|
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|
|
Server Port (1) > 23
|
|
|
Server Port (1) <= 25: MAIL
|
|
|
Server Port (1) > 25: SERVICES
|
Server Port (1) > 53
|
|
Server Port (1) <= 80
|
|
|
RTT avg a b (119) <= 0.213446
|
|
|
|
max data wire (15) <= 251
|
|
|
|
|
med data wire b a (176) <= 60.5
|
|
|
|
|
|
FFT a b (Frequency #4) (232) <= 0.003286
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
RTT samples a b (113) <= 1: WWW
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
RTT samples a b (113) > 1: ATTACK
|
|
|
|
|
|
FFT a b (Frequency #4) (232) > 0.003286: WWW
|
|
|
|
|
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|
|
|
|
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|
|
|
|
|
zero win adv a b (91) <= 0
|
|
|
|
|
|
RTT min a b (115) <= 0.002001
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
avg segm size a b (85) <= 150
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mean data ip (20) <= 603.75: WWW
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mean data ip (20) > 603.75
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
triple dupacks b a (142) <= 0: ATTACK
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
triple dupacks b a (142) > 0: WWW
tree continues...

Figure 2.3:

This is an example decision tree generated from the test set discussed
in Section 4.1.1
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2.3.1 C4.5 Decision Tree.

A tree functions as the classifier, where the

nodes represent features for a decision and the edges pertain to values or conditions
for all possible outcomes. The algorithm intends to provide a classification capability
by uncovering “the structure of the domain” [70]. Figure 2.3 illustrates an example
decision tree generated by the data set discussed in Section 4.1.1. A sample is classified
by following a path from the root to a leaf, where the leaf node represents the class.
The tree is generated by dividing a sample set into two or more partitions based on
a set of mutually exclusive outcomes for a decision node. A decision node constitutes
a test on a selected feature. This process iteratively splices the partitions to develop
additional decision nodes until each partition contains a single class or no further
improvement may be made. The algorithm performs a greedy selection of tests for
decision nodes, based on entropy gain. Extensions to the algorithm utilize alternate
evaluation functions (e.g., Gini index, misclassification rate) [9]. For each decision
node, tests are examined on the entire feature set resulting in multiple decision nodes
with a given feature, but distinct tests. For a nominal feature, the test constitutes an
edge for each possible value of the feature or a subset of distinct values may define an
edge. For a continuous feature, a demarcating value is selected to split the set into 2
partitions.
To select a feature and test for a decision node, the gain ratio for entropy of the
partitions is maximized. The standard form of entropy in bits (i.e., expected value of
information in bits), H, is
H=−

n
X
i=1

pi × log2 pi ,

(2.5)

where there are n values, and pi is the probability of a given event. Entropy may also
be calculated by
H=

n
X
i=1

pi × I,

(2.6)

where I = − log2 pi is the amount of information in a given event. Entropy, H, is
used multiple times in the splitting process to assess the amount of information in
a set based on three perspectives. The three perspectives of a set’s entropy are in
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regards to the classes in the set, the classes in partitions of the set and the size of the
set’s partitions (e.g., inf o(S), inf oX (S), and split inf o(X), respectively).
The entropy of the training set or a partitioned subset, S, in regards to separating classes is determined by

inf o(S) = −

k 
X
f req(Cj , S)
j=1

|S|


f req(Cj , S)
× log2
,
|S|

(2.7)

where there are k classes, Cj is a given class, f req(Cj , S) is the count of the given
class in set S, and |S| is the cardinality of the set. Entropy of the classes in partitions
for a given test, X, on a set is determined by
inf oX (S) =

n 
X
|Si |
i=1

|S|


× inf o(Si ) ,

(2.8)

where there are n partitions and Si is a given partition. The information gain of the
test, X, is calculated as
gain(X) = inf o(S) − inf oX (S).

(2.9)

The gain must be normalized to prevent situations where a single uninformative feature causes partitions consisting of a single sample or very small sets. Partitions of
a single sample result in an inf oX (S) = 0 so the gain would be maximized, but the
classifier would provide no utility. This situation is alleviated by determining the
entropy of a set in regards to partition size for a given test as
split inf o(X) = −

n 
X
|Si |
i=1


|Si |
× log2
.
|S|
|S|

(2.10)

In Equation 2.10, split inf o(X) approaches zero for uninformative splits with small
numbers of samples in the partitions. By maximizing the gain ratio,
gain ratio(X) = gain(X)/split inf o(X),
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(2.11)

one will be able to maximize the information gain of a given test, while preventing
uninformative splits. An additional constraint may restrict partitions to “reasonable”
number of samples (like two) to avoid trivial splits of individual partitions, where
the gain ratio would be acceptable. As mentioned earlier, the C4.5 algorithm divides
subsets with new tests until a given set has one class or the tests do not improve the
gain ratio significantly. The class of the leaf is determined by the mode of samples
class labels pertaining to the given path. The resulting decision tree “over fits the
data” [70] so the C4.5 algorithm then prunes the tree of decision nodes that do not
facilitate classification. Each time the tree is built, it is pruned by a holdout set within
the training set. The holdout set is treated as a random sample set for which the
probability of error may be estimated for the whole population of potential samples.
The number of errors is modeled as a binomial distribution. The binomial distribution
is appropriate due to a set number of samples (N ) and the errors are independent.
Hence, the occurrence of an error has no impact on any other error. The probability
of error is calculated by
p=

e + 0.5
,
N

(2.12)

where N is number of holdout samples and e is the number of misclassified samples.
The C4.5 method assumes the single observation of errors represents the mean of the
binomial distribution of errors for a given branch. The addition of 0.5 to the assumed
mean of errors is a “half-unit correction for continuity” to improve the approximation
of the binomial distribution as a Normal distribution [57, 78]. The Normal approximation of the binomial distribution is used to estimate the upper confidence limit at
a given confidence level of the probability of error. The Normal approximation may
not be technically valid for a small sample size, but it is used as an estimation of
error. By using the Wilson Score interval [86], the probability of the confidence limit
is determined by
pupper =

p+

2
zα
2N

+ zα
1

q
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2
p
− pN
N
2
+ zNα

+

2
zα
4N 2

,

(2.13)

where zα is the 100 × (1 − α)t h percentile of the Normal distribution for the one-sided
confidence limit. Quinlan [70] notes that the default confidence level is a nonsensical
25%. One-sided confidence levels less than 50% account for occurrences in a tail of the
Normal distribution that goes out towards infinity (i.e., not inclusive of the mean) and
two-sided confidence levels that low would have no meaningful interpretation. Quinlan
is actually referring to a p-value, α, of 0.25 and with a one-sided confidence level of
75%. The 75th percentile of the Normal distribution, z0.25 , is 0.67. Figure 2.4 (b)
illustrates the discussed interpretation of the confidence level. The upper confidence
limit of the number of predicted errors is calculated with
eupper = pupper ∗ N.

(2.14)

To illustrate the error estimate of the upper confidence limit, Figure 2.4 shows two
plots of a binomial distribution (with p = 0.4 and N = 10) overlayed with the corresponding Normal approximation and a horizontal line to denote the upper confidence
limit. Without the correction for continuity, Figure 2.4 (a) underestimates the upper
confidence limit of error (5.06) [69]. The Normal approximation does not account
for the entire bin with the mean (4) in the lower 50% of the distribution causing a
smaller upper confidence limit. Figure 2.4 (b) illustrates a upper confidence limit of
5.55 by shifting the distributions to the right with the correction for continuity and
provides a more accurate estimate of error [69]. By beginning at the bottom of the
tree and traversing up, each subtree is evaluated to determine if replacement with a
potential leaf or branch reduces eupper . By replacing with minimal predicted errors,
the tree theoretically minimizes the error rate. The C4.5 decision tree is an extension
of the algorithm, known as ID3, which preprunes the tree by stopping branch growth
for features that do not have a statistically-significant association with a class and
utilizes the gain for selecting decision nodes [68].
The Decision Tree method (DTM) utilizes the pruned C4.5 decision tree discussed as a classifier to select relevant features. Once the pruned tree has been de-
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Figure 2.4:

75% Confidence level
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The Probability Density Functions (PDFs) illustrate the difference in
the upper confidence limit of the error (eupper ) pending whether the
correction of continuity is used or not. The confidence level for the
upper limit is 75%

veloped, every feature remaining in the tree is chosen for the subset of features. This
method illustrates an embedded approach to feature selection. Cardie [12] shows
the success of using DTM with k-nearest neighbor for reducing the feature set and
selecting matches for natural language processing.
2.3.2 Näive Bayes Classifier.

Näive Bayes classifier uses Bayes theorem

to determine the conditional probability of a class given a set of features [33]. The
algorithm makes a couple of simplifying assumptions. All of the features are assumed
to be independent and there are no hidden attributes that affect the classification of
a sample. The largest posterior identifies the class of the sample. One determines the
posterior of a sample using Bayes theorem,
p(C = c|X = x) =

p(C = c)p(X = x|C = c)
,
p(X = x)

(2.15)

where C and X are the random variables for the class and the sample vector, respectively. The prior, p(C = c), may be estimated by counting the occurrences in the
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training set or by assuming equiprobable classes. With the independence assumption, the likelihood of the sample vector is the product of the likelihood of all of the
features,
p(X = x|C = c) =

Y
i

p(Xi = xi |C = c),

(2.16)

where Xi is the random variable for a given feature in the sample vector and there are i
features. For a numeric feature, the likelihood of the given feature, p(Xi = xi |C = c),
is estimated by determining the unknown parameters of a given distribution. Typically, Näive Bayes uses the Gaussian distribution,
p(Xi = xi |C = c) = √

(xi −µ)2
1
e− 2σ2 ,
2πσ

(2.17)

in estimating the likelihood. The unknown parameters for a Gaussian are the mean, µ,
and standard deviation, σ. For a nominal feature, the likelihood is the probability of
the discrete attribute, Xi given a class. The normalizing constant may be calculated
with
p(X = x) =

X

p(Cj )p(X = x|Cj ),

(2.18)

j

where Cj is the class label and j are the class indices [85]. The normalizing constant
does not need to be calculated since one only needs to normalize the numerator of
the posterior for all the classes to obtain the posterior for each class.
2.3.3 Multilayer Perceptron.

A multilayer perceptron with backpropagation

(BP) is composed of multiple layers of processing elements (PEs) that emulate neurons to provide a nonlinear model for classification [6, 73, 75]. Each PE takes in as
input a linear combination of the outputs of every node from the previous layer and
an associated weight. The product of input and weight pairs are summed and manipulated with an activation function to generate the output to the next layer. Typical
activation functions include the sigmoid and hyperbolic tangent. The BP will have an
input layer, zero or more hidden layers, and an output layer in a directed graph, which
is fully connected from one layer to the next. Figure 2.5 illustrates the conceptual
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Figure 2.5:

Pictured here is a conceptual layout of a multilayer perceptron with
three input nodes (x0i ), two hidden layers of processing elements (PEs)
and two output PEs for classification. The input nodes (x0i ) and PEs
(yij ) are fully connected from one layer to the next. The variables i and
j indicate a reference label and layer, respectively

layout of a BP with one input layer, two hidden layers and one output layer. The
nodes in the input layer consist of a single feature from a sample, so the samples fed
into the BP example (Figure 2.5) would only have three features. Each layer after
the input layer consists of nodes that function as PEs. Hidden layers lie between the
input and output layers. They add non-linearity to a decision boundary (classifier) or
when representing data (regression). The output layer is simply the final layer of PEs,
whose outputs are used for classification. The network learns from labeled samples
and encodes the output as a bit vector with a single high (e.g., 001, 010, and 100)
denoting the classification. The learning process occurs via backpropogation through
the network to update the edge weights based on the error in classification generated
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Figure 2.6:

The processing element (PE) is an example from the first hidden layer
in Figure 2.5. The PE calculates the linear combination (a11 ) from its
0
inputs (x0i ) to include a bias (x00 ) and their respective weights (wi1
). An
1
activation function (h(·)) is applied to a1 to generate the PE’s output
(y11 ). The variables i indicates a reference label for the nodes

for a given input sample. This type of neural network may get large with increased
input features, nodes per hidden layer and the number of hidden layers.
As illustrated by Figure 2.6, each PE consists of two parts [73]. The first part
of a PE calculates the linear combination (alk ) of M inputs for the kth node in the
lth layer by
alk =

M
X

l
yjl−1 .
wkj

(2.19)

j=0

l
The weight, wkj
, is for layer, l, and pertains to the input to node k from node j of

the preceding layer. The output (yjl−1 ) from node, j, in the preceding layer, l − 1 is
an input for the PEs in layer, l. As illustrated in Figure 2.6, the outputs of the nodes
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l
in the input layer are referred to as x0j , vice yj0 . A bias, wk0
, for node k in layer l is

inserted to allow for shifts in the linear combination. To allow for such shifts, y0l−1
is always equal to one. In the second part of a PE, the linear combination, alk , is
then transformed with an activation function to obtain the output of the given PE as
shown by
ykl = h(alk ).

(2.20)

The use of a given activation function, h(·), may require scaling or normalization of
the input sample’s features to obtain the desired performance. The algorithm relies on
nonlinear activation functions since linear combinations of linear activation functions
are strictly linear. There would be no benefit in adding hidden layers. Propagating a
given sample through the BP network constitutes the feedforward process that is used
for classification. Often, classification is performed by having a single output node
for every class, where the desired response is a one for the output PE corresponding
to the class of interest and all the other class output PEs have a response of zero.
Training the network involves propagating the classification error back through
the network to adjust the weights between nodes. To perform the backpropagation
process, the nonlinear activation function must be differentiable so h′ (x) exists. First,
one calculates the errors, δkl , of the output layer, L using
δkL = (Tk − ykL ) h′ (aLk ),

(2.21)

where ykL is the result of the feedforward process and output of the last layer, L, and
Tk equals the expected value of the output node (e.g., zero or one). The weights of a
layer may then be adjusted by
l
l
l
wkj
= wkj
+ α δwkj
.

(2.22)

The weight update allows for a learn rate, α, and accounts for the error in the edge
l
weight, δwkj
. The edge weight is determined by the node’s error in the succeeding
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layer, δkl and the output from the node in the preceding layer, yjl−1 by
l
δwkj
= δkl yjl−1 .

(2.23)

The node’s error in the preceding layer, δkl , is calculated with
δkl = h′ (alk )

X

l+1 l+1
wzk
δz ,

(2.24)

z

l+1
where wzk
is the weight of the edge from node k in the preceding layer to node z in

succeeding layer l + 1, and δzl+1 is the error of the succeeding node, z. One recursively
calculates the weights and errors of nodes in preceding layers until the first layer of
PEs is updated. This results in an update of all of the weights within the BP to allow
for training to a desired accuracy or within a given training time.
2.3.4 Generalized Relevance Learning Vector Quantization Improved.

Gen-

eralized Relevance Learning Vector Quantization Improved (GRLVQI) models the
boundary among classes with prototypes [56]. This version of learning vector quantization implements the concepts of in-class conditional update [56], relevance of features [29], conscience learning [19], and the LVQ2.1 prototype update strategy [37].
Classification of a given sample is determined by assigning the class label of the closest
prototype. A set number of prototypes are associated to each class and are randomly
initialized. Each feature has a relevance, λi , which is initialized to the reciprocal of the
number of features and lies within the range [0,1], where larger values have a greater
relevance. For each training sample, an in-class and out-of-class winning prototype is
found by determining the closest prototypes in relevance-weighted squared Euclidean
distance. The relevance-weighted squared Euclidean distance is
d=

X

f eatures

λi (xi − wi )2 ,

2-23

(2.25)

where xi is the value of a given sample’s feature and wi is the value of a given
prototypes feature. The prototypes are updated based on the in-class conditional
update rule, where only the in-class prototype is updated if the sample is classified
correctly. Otherwise, both the in-class and out-of-class prototypes are updated. The
in-class (wiJ ) and out-of-class (wiK ) prototypes of a feature i are updated by a gradient
descent from a given time-step, t, by
wiJ(t + 1) = wiJ(t) +


4 ǫJ(t) dK f ′ |µ(x)
J
x
−
w
(t)
, and
×
λ
i
i
i
(dJ + dK )2

wiK(t + 1) = wiK(t) −


4 ǫK(t) dJ f ′ |µ(x)
K
×
λ
x
−
w
(t)
.
i
i
i
(dJ + dK )2

(2.26)

(2.27)

The in-class variables include ǫJ(t) for the learn rate at a given time step (t), and dJ
for the relevance-weighted squared Euclidean distance. The out-of-class variables are
denoted with a superscript K. The derivative of the sigmoid (f ′ |µ(x) ) is evaluated for
a given value of the misclassification function, u(x):
µ(x) =

dJ − dK
.
dJ + dK

(2.28)

The misclassification function of a sample (x)produces results on the interval [-1,1].
Values less than zero identify samples that have been classified correctly and values
greater than zero identify misclassified samples. After the prototypes are updated,
the relevance, λi , of the attributes are modified by
2 
2
2 ǫλ f ′ |µ(x)  K
K
J
J
λi(t + 1) = λi(t) − J
,
d xi − wi (t) − d xi − wi (t)
(d + dK )2

(2.29)

where ǫλ is the relevance learn rate [30]. If a relevance is less than zero, it is set to
zero. Additionally, all the relevances are normalized to sum to one.
The GRLVQI algorithm attempts to maintain consistent in-class prototype winner selection via conscience learning [19]. Conscience learning has been shown to increase classification performance with a hyperspectral data set for DeSieno’s LVQ2.1
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classification paradigm [56]. A biased distance, dBias , is used in determining the winning in-class prototype and updates of weight and relevance, where the prototype
bias, B P , is dependent on the prototype selection frequency, F P and the distance to
the prototype from the input sample dP = dJ . The biased distance

1

is determined

by
dBias = dP (1 − B P ).

(2.30)

The winning prototypes frequency is updated using a user-defined parameter, β, by
P
P
P
= Fold
+ β (1 − Fold
).
Fnew

(2.31)

All the other prototypes with the same class have their frequency updated by
P
P
P
Fnew
= Fold
+ β (0 − Fold
).

(2.32)

The bias is calculated with another user-defined parameter, γ, and the number of
prototypes with the same class, P :
P

B =γ




1
P
− Fold .
P

(2.33)

This algorithm refines the updates of the prototypes by means of a learn schedule
for the learn rates, γ and β. The learn schedule will likely be data set specific. This
learning algorithm may be used as a feature selection method of the embedded type.
The feature relevances are used as weightings to select a subset. GRLVQI provides an
iterative approach to developing the feature weights, which is refined as the classifier
learns. This is distinct from the C4.5 algorithm which prunes features after the
generation of the classifier.
1

In reality, the dBias is computed as Equation 2.30 [55]. The original publication of GRLVQI
specifies it as dBias = dP − B P [56].
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2.3.5 RELIEF-F.

RELIEF-F is an extension of the RELIEF algorithm

developed by Kira and Rendell [35, 36] and expanded by Kononenko in [38]. The
RELIEF algorithm for the two class problem estimates the quality of features based
on within feature dimension distances. The algorithm searches for the two nearest
neighbors of a given sample. One is the in-class nearest neighbor denoted the nearest
hit. The other is the out-of-class nearest neighbor denoted the nearest miss. The
weights of the features are adjusted based on single feature distances from the nearest
hit and nearest miss. The RELIEF algorithm works as follows: set all weights W [A] =
0
for i = 1 to m
randomly select an instance R
find nearest hit H and nearest miss M
for A = 1 to number of features
W [A] = W [A] − diff(A, R, H)/m + diff(A, R, M )/m
where m is the number of neighbors to search (at most the training set) and diff(·)
is the distance between the values of a given feature, A, for two instances (e.g., a
given instance (R) and nearest hit (H). For continuous features, the difference is
the normalized distance for the interval [0, 1]. For nominal values, the difference is
either one for distinct values or zero for identical values. Dash and Liu [17] incorrectly
assess the time complexity of the RELIEF algorithm by stating it “requires linear time
in the number of given features and number of instances.” The RELIEF algorithm
has a linear runtime of in respect to the number of features (N ), if the result remains
unsorted. In terms of the number of samples (S), the runtime complexity is O(SlogS)
since the nearest in- and out-of-class neighbor must be found for each sample.
RELIEF-F is one of two modifications to the RELIEF algorithm to account
for missing values, noisy data, and multiple classes. RELIEF-F accounts for a nearest miss, M(C), for each class and the prior probability of the classes, P (C). The
weighting of a feature is determined by the expected difference from the nearest miss.

2-26

RELIEF-F is similar to the RELIEF algorithm above, with a change in the calculation
of the weighting,

W [A] = W [A] − diff(A, R, H)/m + · · ·
X
P (C) · diff(A, R, M (C))/m.
C6=class(R)

Kononenko shows that RELIEF-F doubles the classification accuracy with noisy data,
and significantly improves classification with noise-free data in his experiments [38].
2.3.6 Probability of Error and Average Correlation Coefficient.

Mucciardi

and Gose [63] discuss seven methods for selecting features. These methods seek to
overcome the computationally intractable problem of searching all possible combinations of dimension subsets in finding a “good” subset for classification. The authors
use the term “good” because the methods do not find optimal subsets. This thesis
discusses three of the seven techniques to include probability of error (POE), average correlation coefficient (ACC), and the weighted sum (POEACC). The three
approaches are examples of filter methods.
The first method, POE, ranks features in ascending order of the likelihood of
classification error. The POE associated with a feature is determined by classifying the
training set by the given feature. The resulting percentage of misclassified samples is
then used as the POE for the given dimension. POE inherently makes the assumption
that the features independently influence the classification performance.
The second method, ACC, ranks features by their average correlation coefficients. The correlation used here is the absolute value of Pearson’s correlation coefficient, r, of a pair of features and is calculated by
rx,y =

cov(x, y)
,
sx sy
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(2.34)

where cov(x, y) is the sample set covariance of a pair of features (x and y) and s is a
sample set standard deviation of a given feature. A correlation value of one indicates
a linear relationship between the two sets (x and y) and a value of zero indicates
no linear relationship. The first feature is selected by the lowest POE. The second
feature is selected with the smallest correlation to the highest ranked feature (lowest
POE). Additional features are selected in order of lowest mean correlation to the set
of features already ranked. The mean correlation of a given feature, x with a set of
selected features is determined by
rmean =

P

rx,yi
,
F

F

(2.35)

where there are F selected features and yi is a given selected feature. For example, the
10th feature is selected based on its mean correlation with the first 9 ranked features.
The third method, weighted sum or POEACC, ranks the features in order of
smallest to largest of a weighted sum of POE and ACC. Again, the ordering begins
with the feature with the lowest POE. Succeeding features are chosen by minimizing
the weighted sum,
W = w1 ∗ (POE) + w2 ∗ (ACC).

(2.36)

The weights, w1 and w2 , must sum to 1. Before the first iteration, the POE values
for the features are normalized by
POEnorm
= (POEi − POEmin )/(POEmax POEmin ).
i

(2.37)

With each iteration of selecting the next feature, ACC is also normalized in the same
fashion. As stated by Mucciardi and Gose, the rescaling “represent[s] the true measure
of importance of the terms in Equation 2.36”. This method functions as POE or ACC
depending on whether w1 or w2 is set to 1, respectively.
It is not intuitively obvious to this author how correlation is determined for
nominal data in the POEACC algorithm. The Correlation-Based Feature Selection
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algorithm implements a method of determining a weighted Pearson’s correlation coefficient of nominal data by using the prior of the possible nominal values [28]. This
probabilistic method for determining the correlation of nominal data is incorporated
into the POEACC to handle the requirements of the data set.
2.3.7 Classifier Accuracy Rate.

This section addresses an alternate type of

feature selection that are referred to as wrapper methods. These methods literally
search the combinatorial space of feature subsets. As an example, one may have 248
features which will result in over 4.5 × 1074 possible combinations. One may search
the subset space and evaluate a given feature utilizing a classifier’s accuracy rate. The
classification accuracy provides a direct performance measure of the subset’s capacity
to define the domain boundary. To be able to efficiently and effectively select a
subset of features, one must take advantage of heuristics, local search optimizations
and stochastic sampling to direct the search to a local but useful solution. This thesis
discusses two search algorithms genetic algorithms and best first search.
2.3.7.1 Genetic Algorithms.

Genetic algorithms take advantage of

stochasticity to search a breadth of the state space by evolving states over a series of
generations [76]. The search method modifies the state’s genotype, representation of
the subset, in traversing the space to identify potential solutions called a phenotype.
A combination of random successors and successors developed by combining parents
are used to search the space. The combination of parent genotypes is called crossover
and random selection is considered a mutation. One optimizes a fitness function to
identify and retain valued states (i.e., a defined number of feature subsets) for a given
generation. In this case, the fitness function is the classifier accuracy rate. The search
for a well performing phenotype typically ends after a set number of generations.
2.3.7.2 Best First Search.

A heuristic-based search called best first

search greedily traverses the combinatorial space of features via a tree structure [76].
The classifier accuracy rate serves as the heuristic in guiding the search path. To
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expand the search region and reduce the chance of ending in a relatively poor performing local maxima, a backtracking capability is used to traverse back up the tree
from stale paths that do not increase the performance.
2.4

Summary
This chapter discusses the framework of intrusion detection and the methodolo-

gies for detecting cyber attacks. The two major methodologies include signature-based
and anomaly-based detection. Several anomaly-based machine learning approaches
are reviewed. Research on classification techniques for intrusion detection have been
studied in depth with a large interest in the area of BPs. On the other hand, feature
selection of network flows has been limited to improving performance for a given classifier. Finally, a survey of feature selection methods outlines varied approaches, which
spans the feature selection taxonomy. This review of the literature has not found an
indepth analysis of features for improving performance, minimizing data extraction
requirements, or validating a useful feature subset for the intrusion detection domain.
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III. Feature Selection Methodology
Feature subsets and subset generality for intrusion detection are determined by assessing subset classification performance and analyzing the features composing the
subsets based on domain knowledge. Figure 3.1 illustrates the methodology in creating a subset for each feature selection method and evaluating the subsets for generality.
Feature selection methods generate feature weightings and subsets, which are ranked
to develop an ordered list of subsets in association with each feature selection method.
The subsets are ordered by the number of highest ranked features composing the subset. A common classifier evaluates the performance of the subsets and down select to
a single subset for each feature selection algorithm. The selected subsets are evaluated
for generality based on their performance on a diverse grouping of classifiers. This
chapter continues by discussing the motivation for the work, methods to establish
and evaluate features, an extension to a feature selection method, and the evaluation
techniques for classification performance and statistical analysis.
3.1

Intrusion Detection and Feature Selection
Intrusion detection provides an application and motivation for the feature selec-

tion objective of this thesis. An intrusion detection system obtains information from
sensors within a network to record and possibly process raw data [40]. The detection
system generates alarms, which may generate an action back on the network or notify
a network administrator. Feature selection may significantly improve classification
performance and/or reduce the required capacity to monitor, manipulate, evaluate,
and store the massive amount of real-time data expected to be seen over a network.
Some feature selection methods add a significant amount of processing time and may
require retraining of a classifier (e.g., C4.5 Decision Tree) so real-time implementation
of some feature selection methods is not feasible without extraordinary processing capacity. Feature selection can play a role in reducing the quantity of data read off the
network by utilizing it as a preprocessing step in developing a classifier-based anomaly
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Figure 3.1:

The feature analysis process assesses the effectiveness of feature selection methods, and analyzes feature subset generality

detector. Additionally, feature selection may be utilized to enhance the classification
performance via post-processing analysis of recorded traffic.
Figure 3.2 illustrates the feature selection process for determining and validating a good feature subset. In this thesis, a number of feature selection algorithms
are compared to determine a good feature set. The feature selection algorithms perform the generation and evaluation methods, and a stopping criteria in obtaining a
subset from a previously extracted and processed set of features. The classification
methods under test identify cyber attacks and network services for the evaluation and
validation components of the process. The validation piece involves testing the selected feature subset for performance in several cases for usefulness such as predictive
accuracy, number of features selected and the generality of the features. The intrusion detection system is not integrated into a genuine architecture for the purpose of
network surveillance. Although, processed data from real network traffic is used in
selecting features and testing the effectiveness of subsets. The intended results of this
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Figure 3.2:

This is the feature selection process from Dash and Liu [17]. Subsets
of features are generated and evaluated. Based on a stopping criteria,
the highest evaluated subset is selected

work includes a validated feature subset for intrusion detection and an analysis as to
why the features function well.
3.2

Establishing and Evaluating Feature Subsets
One may accomplish an evaluation of features in a direct or indirect fashion.

Direct evaluation involves a priori knowledge of the features. Absolute understanding
of the features and their role in classifying attacks or network services would mean
an expert may just select the optimal feature set. In actuality, a person understands
aspects of the domain, which would allow for identification of a modicum of representative features or analysis as to why certain features perform well. For example, an
expert would come to the correct conclusion that well-known port numbers provide a
very good method for classifying network services. However, port numbers would be
uninformative when a flow is masquerading as another network service (e.g., spoofing attack or peer-to-peer traffic). Analysis of other flow features may provide the
needed information to classify these flows. Indirect evaluation requires assessment of
the performance of a classifier to determine a good feature subset. Even though a
specific feature selection technique may provide an optimal subset for the given evaluation method, the selected subset would not be optimal for the general classification
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task [17]. This thesis indirectly evaluates feature subsets with classifier performance
and directly evaluates the relevance of the selected features.
A set of feature selection methods are used to evaluate important features for
performing intrusion detection (Figure 3.1 (A)). The chosen feature selection algorithms for comparison span the taxonomy discussed in Section 2.2.1 to include:
RELIEF-F, the C4.5 Decision Tree Method (DTM), Probability of Error and Average
Correlation Coefficient (POEACC), Generalized Relevance learning Vector Quantization Improved (GRLVQI), classifier accuracy rate with genetic algorithms and best
first search, and median Bhattacharyya methods. Additionally, the comparison includes the minimum surface Bhattacharyya method, which is a proposed extension
to the median Bhattacharyya method (see Section 3.3). Table 3.1 outlines some
differences and commonalities between the methods. These methods utilize varied
approaches for finding and measuring relevant features such as distance, dependencies, information theory, separability, actual performance, individual weightings of
features, stochastic subset search, and heuristic subset search. The methods encompass all three categories of Blum and Langley’s taxonomy [7] and cover a majority
of Dash and Lui’s evaluation and generation methods [17]. Individually, the methods
provide a capacity for handling noisy, irrelevant, redundant, and/or interdependent
data. Furthermore, all of the feature selection methods handle continuous, discrete
and nominal data. These methods are not couched to be the best approaches for
this domain, since top performing feature selection methods have not been identified in the literature. This diverse group of feature selection algorithms allows for
varied “perspectives” to accentuate relevant features that may not be selected otherwise. Consistency among the subsets suggests strengthened evidence of a feature’s
relevance.
3.2.1 Ordering Subsets for Evaluation.

This section discusses the method

for ranking and ordering subsets for selecting a subset per feature selection method
(Figure 3.1 (B)). Some feature selection algorithms such as GRLVQI, POEACC and
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Table 3.1:
Feature Selection Method
Best First
C4.5
Genetic
RELIEF-F
POEACC
GRLVQI
Median Bhattacharyya
Minimum Surface Bhattacharyya

Characteristics of Feature Selection Methods
Evaluation Measure

Generation Method

Blum and Langley Category

Accuracy Rate
Entropy
Accuracy Rate
Feature distance
Correlation
Sample distance
Separability
Separability

Best First Search
feature evaluation
Genetic Algorithm
Class-based feature evaluation
Feature evaluation
Prototype-based feature evaluation
Inter-class feature evaluation
Inter-class feature evaluation

Wrapper
Embedded
Wrapper
Filter
Filter
Embedded
Filter
Filter

RELIEF-F provide a list of weighted features. A rank is assigned to each feature
based on its weighting, where the highest and lowest weighted features receive a rank
of one and the number of features, respectively. For a set of T -Monte-Carlo runs with
k-folds each, the median rank is used to order the complete set of features. If there is
a tie based on median rank, it is broken by the skewness of the features’ rank results
over the folds. Smaller skewness results in a feature coming first in the order, since
positive skew results in a right-handed tail (tending toward larger rank) and negative
skew indicates a left-handed tail (tending toward smaller rank). Ordered subsets for
a weighted feature selection algorithm may be generated by starting with the first
feature of smallest median rank and adding successively ranked features iteratively.
For example, the three highest ranked features from the POEACC algorithm are
initial window in bytes from client to server (rank 1: feature 95), minimum interarrival time (rank 2: feature 3), and the variance of the inter-arrival time (rank 3:
feature 9). The first three ordered subsets are:
• Subset 1: 95
• Subset 2: 95, 3
• Subset 3: 95, 3, 9.
Some feature selection algorithms (DTM and classifier accuracy rate with genetic and best first search) select a feature subset for each fold. For a set of T -MonteCarlo runs with k-folds each, features are ranked by the number of folds, where a
feature is included in a selected subset. Features that appear in the greatest number
of folds (maximum of T × k folds) are ranked highest. For example, the seven highest
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Table 3.2:

Top Four Features from Accuracy Rate with Genetic Algorithm

Feature Index
1
2
83
129
86
105
168

Feature Name

Times Selected for Subset Rank

Server Port
Client Port
Minimum Segment Size from Client to Server
Maximum Full-size RTT sample
Average Segment Size from Server to Client
Truncated Packets from Client to Server
First Quartile Size of Data Control Portion of Packet

300
300
299
286
278
276
276

1
1
2
3
4
5
5

ranked features from the accuracy rate with a genetic algorithm method are listed
in Table 3.2. Sets of features included in the same number of folds are considered
a grouping (e.g., features 1 and 2 are a grouping) and feature 83 is a grouping of
one. Ordered subsets are generated by iterating down the set of ranked features. The
first ordered subset consists of the grouping with the largest number of folds (i.e.,
the highest rank). Successively lower-ranked groupings are iteratively added to the
preceding ordered subset to generate all the ordered subsets. For accuracy rate with
a genetic algorithm, the ordered subsets from the top seven features are:
• Subset 1: 1, 2
• Subset 2: 1, 2, 83
• Subset 3: 1, 2, 83, 129
• Subset 4: 1, 2, 83, 129, 86
• Subset 5: 1, 2, 83, 129, 86, 105, 168.
3.2.2 Determining a Subset for Each Feature Selection Algorithm.

With

successive subsets for a given feature selection algorithm, a single subset for the specific
feature selection algorithm may then be found (Figure 3.1 (C)). There are two typical
approaches to selecting a subset [17, 46]. The first is to set a weighting threshold or a
predefined limit in the number of features. The second method utilizes classification
performance to choose a subset as implemented in this thesis. The Näive Bayes
classifier discussed in Section 2.3.2 determines the classification performance of each
of the ordered subsets. Classification performance is evaluated with the Näive Bayes
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classifier primarily due to computational speed, which allows for a multitude of subsets
to be evaluated within a reasonable amount of time. Approximately 1,800 ordered
subsets are evaluated to down select to 8 subsets, one per feature selection method.
Furthermore, Witten, et al. [87] and Moore [60] notes that the performance of the
Näive Bayes classifier is sensitive to redundant and irrelevant features. Hence, the
trend in Näive Bayes classification performance is indicative of how well a given feature
selection method identifies relevant features.
One expects that the domain space and decision boundary to be adequately
represented by more than one feature subset. If a feature selection algorithm appropriately ranks the subsets, one would expect a consistent and dramatic increase in
performance until the domain has been adequately represented. Figure 3.3 illustrates
the hyperbolic tangent, which is analogous to the behavior anticipated from ordered
subsets from a feature selection method. For the ordered subsets from a perfect feature
selection algorithm, the first subset of the plateau is the smallest subset of the entire
feature set that best represents the domain. From the first subset of the plateau,
added features cause diminishing returns in classification performance. Based on this
expectation of behavior, one may select the first subset where the difference between
adjacent subsets stabilizes below a given threshold, which indicates a plateau in performance. Additionally, a multiple comparison of the classification performance from
the subsets indicates whether there are statistically-significant differences between the
performance of ordered subsets as discussed in Section 3.4.2. This allows one to select
a smaller subset in number of features (than the plateau indicates) if the classification
performance of the smaller subset is the same as or better than a larger subset (i.e.,
the initially selected subset due to the plateau).
With a set of selected feature subsets from each algorithm, reduction to a single
subset of features to represent the domain is ideal but may not be effective. If a
sufficiently small number of distinct features remain in the final set, then an exhaustive
search of all combinations likely determines the best performer with the Näive Bayes
classifier [8,17]. If the number of features remaining (i.e., union of the selected subsets)
3-7

Mean Equal Weighted Accuracy

Performance of Ordered Subsets

Number of Features in Subset
Figure 3.3:

The hyperbolic tangent represents the expected trend in classification
performance of ordered subsets from feature selection algorithms

is too large, one may re-rank the features and down select to a single subset in a similar
manner to that discussed in Section 3.2.1. Neither approach helps in establishing a
subset to ”appropriately” describe the decision boundary. Since the feature selection
algorithms have significant differences among them, their capacity to provide the
best subset for the given data set is unequal. Some feature selection algorithms will
perform better than others in different respects. Due to the differences in feature
selection methods, a cogent method for combining the subsets may not be warranted.
For example, some will handle synergies (e.g accuracy rate with best first search)
while others will not (e.g., RELIEF-F). Synergistic combinations would likely be lost
with the ordered approach. An unsatisfying approach selects the statistically best
performing subset. Even this approach may result in a subset which does not have
generality. A down selection to a single subset will not be performed; all the feature
subsets will be assessed for generality.
3.2.3 Generality of Features.

The final step of the process determines

whether the selected feature subsets provide an adequate description of the domain
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space for establishing a set of decision boundaries (Figure 3.1 (D)). A subset demonstrating generality is able to represent the domain in such a manner. One may determine generality by answering the following question: Does the subset increase
performance for a set of classifiers [46]? In the worst case, a feature subset would optimize the performance of only a given classifier due to the specific learning method.
There are numerous classifiers that may be utilized for assessment of generality. Figure 3.4 is recreated from Holmström, et al. [32], which paints the relationships between
common classifiers. The schematic relationships provide a basis for selecting differing
types of classifiers. The x-axis represents architectural flexibility, which is indicative
of error-based correction techniques, incremental learning, or other learning methods
that provide adaptation to the training set. The y-axis pertains to neural or nonneural training approaches so neural training would implement processing elements
or prototypes requiring “local computations” [32]. Nonneural training is categorized
by statistical representations of the training set such as local averages or kernel estimation. C4.5 and Näive Bayes were added to Figure 3.4 based on the thesis author’s
interpretation of the depiction.
With time as a limiting factor, four classifiers of different learning and identification methods are selected to illustrate the generality of the features: C4.5, Näive
Bayes, GRLVQI, and multilayer perceptron with backpropagation (BP). Figure 3.4
shows the four classifiers covering a broad range over the classifier taxonomy. Näive
Bayes lies in the lower left-hand quadrant and C4.5 lies near the center-right. BP
and GRLVQI lies at the top right, where GRLVQI is an extension of LVQ. Additionally, Table 3.3 denotes the distinctions between the specific classification methods.
C4.5 is an information theory based classifier that is assembled using a divide and
conquer approach and then prunes based on the probability of error of the subtrees.
Quinlan [70] refers to C4.5 as a “logical” classification model since the decision tree
may be described with expressions of predicate logic. Näive Bayes utilizes maximum
likelihood based on a Gaussian distribution, while treating the features as statistically
independent (this is the “näive” assumption). GRLVQI provides a prototype-based
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Figure 3.4:

The schematic of the classifier taxonomy from [32] illustrates the distinctions in learning and architecture between the classification methods for assessing generality (e.g., C4.5, Näive Bayes, GRLVQI, and BP)

Table 3.3: Characteristics of Classification Methods
Classification Method
Evaluation Method
Classification Model
C4.5
GRLVQI
BP
Näive Bayes

Entropy
Sample Distance
Non-linear combination
Bayes Theorem
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Logical
Prototype-based
Nonlinear
Probabilistic
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Figure 3.5:

Feature z has poor performance in general. For two class pairs (e.g., 5
and 35), feature z provides the best (minimum) separability. The mean
performance for this example is 0.2, 0.5, and 0.6782 for x, y, and z,
respectively. The current minimum surface consists mostly of feature x
and two class pairs of feature z

learning method based on distance, which prioritizes features based on their classification potential. The GRLVQI classifier learns and prioritizes features simultaneously.
Finally, the BP is a nonlinear neural network trained based on the backpropogation
of error through the network.
Statistically-significant improvement between subsets is determined by multiple
comparison of the classification performance results for a given classifier as discussed
in Section 3.4.2. For the identified classification algorithms, the classification performance of the selected subsets from each feature selection method are compared to the
classification performance of all the features. Performance gains for all the classifiers
by a given feature subset demonstrates generality for the network traffic classification
problem.
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3.3

A Proposed Feature Selection Approach
The mean or class-weighted Bhattacharyya methods for feature selection, from

Section 2.2.1.1, is lacking in finding the smallest set of features for the multiple-class
classification problem. This section details a new approach for selecting features based
on Bhattacharyya coefficients. The approach treats the Bhattacharyya coefficient for
the C(C − 1)/2 pairs of C classes as a surface and sorts the features by iteratively
selecting members consisting of the minimum surface. This feature selection approach
will be referred to as the minimum surface Bhattacharyya method. For example,
Figure 3.5 depicts the surfaces of three features. The mean of the features are 0.2,
0.5 and 0.6782 for features x, y, and z, respectively. The mean of the three surfaces
obfuscates features with the best separability for a given class pair. That is, the
mean (or median) Bhattacharyya represents average (or median) performance and
has no intelligent way of adapting to local “best performance” in its ordering process.
By selecting the features creating the minimum surface (e.g., features x and z in
the first iteration), the separability for each class pair is optimized in the feature
ordering. Hence, features are greedily selected in a manner that preserves the best
separability without searching through all combinations of features. The order of the
features utilizing the minimum surface are x, z, and then y. If the number of class
pairs exceeds the number of features, the ordered list of features from the minimum
surface method approaches the median method when there is high variability in the
Bhattacharyya values across the class pair space. Modifying the example in Figure 3.5,
lets make the three features (x, y, and z) each have a minimum of 0.1 at separate
class pairs. A minimum surface method results in a sorted list of features based on
the median.
Algorithm III.1 details the pseudocode for implementing the sorting method
based on the minimum surface. The proposed minimum surface method for sorting the
features maintains an open list of all the features. The method selects all the features
that have a minimum value for a given class pair across the entire combinatorial space
of pairings. If there is a tie in the minimum value for a given class pair, the feature
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Algorithm III.1 Minimum Surface Bhattacharyya Pseudocode: The Pseudocode
sorts based on the minimum surface of Bhattacharyya coefficients. If two features lie
on the minimum surface at the same class pair, the tie is resolved by the feature with
smallest median Bhattacharyya value.
Require: Array f [0, number of f eatures − 1] of value arrays {a value array per
feature}
Require: Arrays value[0, number of class pairs − 1] of real numbers {a Bhattacharyya coefficient per class pair}
sorted list ← < empty list >
open list ← [1, number of f eatures] {list of all feature indices}
while open list is not empty do
min value ← min(f, open list) {array of minimum Bhattacharyya coefficients
for each class pair in open list}
min surf ace ← < empty list >
for i = 0 to number of class pairs do {find the features that generate the
current minimum surface}
temp ← −1
for each feature index, j, in open list do
if f [j].value[i] = min value[i] then
if temp = -1 or median(f [j].value) < median(f [temp].value) then {if
multiple features have minimum value, select feature with smallest median}
temp ← j
end if
end if
end for
min surf ace ← union(min surf ace, temp)
end for
sort min surf ace from smallest to largest median Bhattacharyya value
append min surf ace to end of sorted list
open list ← difference between sets(open list, min surf ace) {remove features in
min surf ace from open list}
end while
return sorted list {sorted list of feature indices}
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with the smallest median Bhattacharyya value is selected. The selected features
(composing the minimum surface) may then be sorted by their median value, added
to the end of the sorted list, and then removed from the open list. The method is
performed iteratively until all of the features have been removed from the open list.
The result of method is an ordered list of features, where a subset may be selected
based on a threshold or approach outlined in Section 3.2.2.
By sorting the features based on their minimum Bhattacharyya coefficient, one
will guarantee the features that provide the best separability for each class will be ordered first. Assuming the correlation of separation and performance is maintained for
various classification problems, this method should result in a smaller subset providing comparable performance to that of the mean or median Bhattacharyya method.
Fundamentally, the Bhattacharyya coefficient bases a given feature distribution on a
sampling of data, not a model of the data. The method assumes the sampling accurately represents the data population in selecting features. Redundant features will
impact the capacity in obtaining the minimal set. Although they will not lie on the
same minimum surface, the redundant features will be sorted in successive surfaces.
Hence, the method does not have a manner for handling highly correlated data. For
features that are highly correlated, one of the features may be removed from the open
list in advance of the sort to minimize the feature set.
3.4

Evaluation Techniques
This section expands on two aspects of the feature analysis process that are

not explicitly depicted in Figure 3.1, but Section 3.2 outlines as criteria or methods
of analysis. First, the criteria for portraying classification performance is defined.
Second, the statistical analysis methods for analyzing the classification performance
results are covered.
3.4.1 Measuring Classifier Performance.

A classifier’s equal weighted ac-

curacy (EWA) is used to compare the classification performance of a given feature
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subset with another subset or the entire set for a given classification method. The
EWA is a non-biased performance estimate, where each class accuracy contributes
equally. The EWA is computed as:
M
C
1 X X 1(if xm ∈ Xc & ym = c)
EW A =
,
C m=1 c=1
Mc

(3.1)

where M is the number of samples, Mc is the number of samples in class c, C is
the number of classes, and 1(·) is an an indicator function. The indicator function
evaluates true (i.e., 1) if the sample xm is a member of the class c set (Xc ) and the
predicted class label, ym , is class c. Otherwise, the indicator function evaluates false
(i.e., 0). A less formal definition is the average of all the class accuracies. For a
non equal weighted accuracy (NEWA), the accuracy is calculated by the number of
correctly classified samples divided by the total number of samples. The NEWA is
biased by the performance of the classes with disproportionately large samples, which
is the case for some classes in this thesis as discussed in Section 4.1.1.
3.4.2 Determining the Statistical Significance of Classifier Improvement for
Retained Features.

Statistical analysis intends to highlight statistically-significant

differences among the results. The method for determining statistical significance is
dependent on the distribution of a given set of results to be analyzed. The Anderson
Darling Test determines the type of test which needs to be performed. Then, one of
two methods for performing a multiple comparison are used. At times, the nonparametric multiple comparison method is too conservative so a paired nonparametric test
called the Wilcoxon Signed Rank test determines statistical significance between two
sets of runs (i.e., classification performance of two subsets).
3.4.2.1 Anderson Darling Test.

The Anderson-Darling test is used

to determine whether a set of EWA results for T -Monte-Carlo runs follow a Normal
distribution with a confidence level of 95%. Analysis of normally distributed and nonnormally distributed results warrant distinct techniques due to limiting assumptions
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and performance attributes of the techniques. The Anderson-Darling test has been
demonstrated a more powerful test than other approaches like the χ2 test and performs
well with long tails where the Shapiro-Wilk test suffers [83]. The Anderson-Darling
test does not require estimates of key parameters (e.g., mean and standard deviation)
and works for any distribution. In testing for normality, a random variable, X, is
assumed to be Normal (null hypothesis) and assessed whether the test statistic exceeds
the prescibed critical value for a given p-value. Tables of critical values have been
established for comparison with the test statistic and may be found in [83]. The
Anderson Darling test functions by first normalizing the classification performance
results from the runs, Xi , with the mean, X̄ and standard deviation, s, using
Yi =

Xi − X̄
.
s

(3.2)

The original test statistic, A2 , is calculated using the CDF of the sample data, F (Yi ),
n

A2 = −n −

1X
(2i − 1)[log F (Yi ) + log(1 − F (Yn−i+1 ))] ,
n i=1

(3.3)

where n is the number of performance samples (i.e., T -Monte-Carlo runs). A modification of the Anderson Darling test statistic for normality by Stephens [16] reduces
the required table of critical values to a single vector that does not need to account
for the sample size. The modified test statistic is calculated by,
"

#
2.25
0.75
A∗ = A2 1 +
+ 2 .
n
n

(3.4)

If A∗ exceeds the critical values listed in Table 3.4 from [16], then the sample data
set is not normally distributed at the indicated p-value. The procedure is valid for
sample sizes greater than eight.
3.4.2.2 Multiple Comparison of Classification Performance Runs.
Classification performance results from unique subsets are compared for statistically-
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Table 3.4:

Critical Values for Testing Normality using modified Anderson Darling
Test from [16]
p-value
0.1
0.05 0.025 0.01 0.005
Critical Value 0.631 0.752 0.873 1.035 1.159

significant differences utilizing multiple comparison methods. The multiple comparison methods are useful for parametric and nonparametric analysis. Parametric analysis assumes a distribution of the results (i.e., Gaussian in this case). Nonparametric
analysis allows for comparison of distributions, which do not meet the normality criterion. Both methods are similar in approach but the data is viewed from distinct
perspectives. The multiple comparison of normally distributed results utilize the values of a set of runs for a given subset to determine means and standard deviations.
The nonparametric method ranks each data sample (run) of all the subsets in the
multiple comparison to establish am ordering every sample from smallest to largest.
Nonparametric analysis utilizes the rank means and rank standard deviations.
A multiple comparison of the T -Monte-Carlo runs of k-fold cross validation utilizes a family-wise confidence level of 95% to determine a statistically-significant differences [71]. The family-wise confidence level accounts for the compound uncertainty
generated by the combination of pairwise comparisons. The pairwise comparisons
cause very low family-wise confidences with a combination of paired hypothesis tests.
The comparison of multiple sets utilizes half width confidence intervals determined
by
half width = Mprocedure ∗ SE,

(3.5)

where Mprocedure is a procedure-specific multiplier and SE is the standard error of
the pooled sets. Any overlap in confidence intervals centered at the sets’ mean or
mean rank indicates no statistical difference. The standard error, SE, is calculated
as follows

s
X 1
,
SE = sp
n
i
g
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(3.6)

where sp is the pooled standard deviation, g the number of groups (i.e., subsets for
comparison), and ni a given groups sample size (i.e., T -Monte-Carlo runs). The
pooled standard deviation is defined as

sp =

sP

2
g (ni − 1)si
P
,
g ni − 1

(3.7)

where si is the standard deviation of group i. Nonparametric analysis of the systems
may be performed by replacing the standard deviation, si with the standard deviation
of the ranks.
There are several methods for determining the multiplier such as the TukeyKramer and Bonferroni procedures [71]. Tukey-Kramer assumes normally distributed
results, where Bonferroni does not. The Tukey-Kramer multiplier provides highly
accurate intervals for a given confidence level and is calculated by
MT ukey−Kramer =

qI,d.f. (1 − α)
√
,
2

(3.8)

where qI,d.f. (1 − α) is the 100 × (1 − α)t h percentile of the Studentized Range distribution for I groups and d.f. degrees of freedom. Alternatively, the Bonferroni multiplier
for non-normally distributed results is the 100x(1 − α/k)t h percentile of the Student’s
t distribution, td.f. (1 − α/2k). The number of possible paired comparisons is k and
determined by
k=

I(I − 1)
.
2

(3.9)

The confidence level utilizing the Bonferroni multiplier is not predictable like the
Tukey-Kramer multiplier. Although, the Bonferroni multiplier always results in a
conservative confidence interval [71].
3.4.2.3 Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test.

The difference in performance

between two classifiers of distinct feature subsets is established with hypothesis testing for a p < 0.05. Two generally accepted paired tests include the Student’s t-test
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and Wilcoxon signed-rank test [57]. These methods for hypothesis testing may be
applicable depending on whether a given set of performance runs are normally distributed or not. For this thesis, the Wilcoxon sign-rank test is required at times for
non-normally distributed results due to the overly conservative nature of the multiple
comparison test with the Bonferroni multiplier.
The Wilcoxon signed-rank test compares pairs of observations from two sample
sets to determine whether they have the same median. The test assesses the null
hypothesis that the difference between the sample sets is zero [24]. Hence, sample
sets X and Y contain samples X1 , X2 , X3 , Y1 , Y2 , and Y3 . The absolute differences
between the samples, |Xi − Yi |, are ordered and ranked from smallest to largest from
one to the number of pairs, n. If there is a tie, the rank is the average rank of the
tied differences. The rank is given a sign that matches the true difference between
the samples, except for when there is a difference of zero. The sign given to the rank
of a difference of zero will hinder the rejection of the null hypothesis. The two-sided
test statistics can then be computed by selecting the smaller value of the sums of the
absolute of the negative ranks (W− ) or the sum of the positive ranks (W+ ). The test
statistics may then be compared to a critical value from a table found in a statistics
book [24, 57] based on the desired p-value and the number of sample pairs, n. If the
test statistic is less than the critical value, the null hypothesis may be rejected and
there is a statistically-significant difference in the medians of the sample sets. For
example, Table 3.5 illustrates the Wilcoxon signed rank test on two classifiers over
four runs. The test statistics are W− = 12.5 and W+ = 8.5 and the critical value for
a two-sided test with a p-value of 0.05 is 1. Since neither test statistics are less than
one, there is no statistically-significant difference between the classifiers at a two-sided
95% confidence interval.
3.5

Summary
This chapter outlines a methodology for quantitatively selecting a reduced fea-

ture subset and assessing the generality of feature subsets with classifier performance.
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Table 3.5:

Example Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test

Run Classifier A Classifier B
1
2
3
4
5
6

0.70
0.95
0.95
0.88
0.90
0.80

0.90
0.85
0.65
0.98
0.95
0.95

Difference

Rank

-0.20
0.10
0.30
-0.10
-0.05
-0.15

-5
2.5
6
-2.5
-1
-4

Statistical methods are covered for the comparative analysis of the performance evaluations. The resulting feature subsets will also be scrutinized against studies into
the characterizations of network traffic. The process intends to lead to a well balanced and thorough evaluation of established techniques of feature selection methods
to include a proposed extension to a current method for analyzing separability. The
results of this work are discussed in the following chapter.
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IV. Experimental Results and Analysis
This chapter covers the experimental design, results and validation of results. The
experimental design covers the data set and parameters for implementing the experiments. The results detail the analysis for subset selection and assessment of the
generality of the selected subsets. Lastly, the results are validated and reaffirmed
using the literature on flow characterization of several flow types.
4.1

Design of Experiments
This section discusses particularities of the experimental setup and runs. The

rationale for the selecting the data set are reviewed. The composition of the data set
and complexity for the given task are also discussed. The section outlines the specifics
on the parameters of the machine learning algorithms and the Monte-Carlo runs.
4.1.1 Data Set.

Many references pertaining to intrusion detection utilize

a training and testing data set developed from Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency’s (DARPA’s) Intrusion Detection Evaluations [27, 45]. The data sets contain
weeks of simulated traffic with labels for identifying malicious from normal traffic.
The Massachusetts Institute of Technology Lincoln Laboratory modeled the network
traffic of an Air Force Base and inserted known cyber attacks. Lincoln Laboratories
performed two evaluations on the simulated data sets in 1998 and 1999. A portion
of this data was used to generate a data set for a 1999 competition by the University
of California, Irvine, Knowledge Discovery in Data (KDD99) [10]. The DARPA and
KDD99 data sets and other artificial data sets are not ideal for training or testing a
classifier or assessing classification methodologies. The underlying problem of such
data sets result from the generation of background traffic from probabilistic models
with attack traffic injected into the flows [74]. Since background traffic conforms to
ideal distributions, a classifier based on such a data set does not contend with the
noise of real network traffic. Furthermore, McHugh [54] comments that no apparent
validation was performed on the artificial background traffic of the DARPA data set,
which may bias the results.
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Ideally, real network traffic provides the basis for a data set to train a classifier.
Moore [61] developed such a data set and documented a detailed description of its
features, and method for generation. Moore’s data set contains a day of authentic network traffic that was classified by the type of traffic in accordance with the procedure
in [59]. The traffic labeled as cyber attacks have been determined utilizing known signatures. The attack traffic are mostly categorized as worms and viruses. A recreated
table of the features contained in the data set from [61] is listed in Appendix B.
The data set provides a look into a real world application of the feature selection
problem since it is extracted from a day of network traffic and has already been
processed for metrics and statistics [61]. The data set contains 377,526 samples of
network flows, 248 features, and 12 classes, whose features include nominal, discrete,
continuous, missing and noisy values. The samples of the data are restricted to bidirectional Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) flows. A portion of the data set is
utilized for this work since the original data set consists of too many network flows
to handle in a reasonable amount of time and the author encountered unresolvable
heap space issues with the original data set. The reduced data set consists of 40,858
flows. A majority of the flows consist of email and world wide web traffic so they
have been limited in the reduced data set. One class has been entirely removed due
to insufficient instances. The composition by class of the original and reduced data
set is shown in Table 4.1.
The features may be categorized by protocol parameters, performance, volume
and size. The categories describe the type of flow characteristics (e.g., features)
extracted in creating the data set. The protocol parameters include information taken
directly from packet-level headers. Performance pertains to a combination features
that are affected by flow and network dynamics (e.g., throughput). Volume includes
the quantity of certain distinguishing packet traits. Size encompasses features that
describe the flows in terms of bytes. Table 4.2 provides several examples of features
by category. The features describe host to host sub flows and aggregate bidirectional
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Table 4.1:
Class

Data Sets - Number of Instances in each Class
Original Data Set Reduced Data Set

Games
Interactive
Multimedia
Attack
Peer-to-peer
Services
Database
File Transfer Protocol-passive
File Transfer Protocol-control
File Transfer Protocol-data
Mail
World Wide Web
Total

8
110
576
1,793
2,094
2,099
2,648
2,688
3,054
5,797
28,567
328,092
377,526

0
110
576
1,793
2,094
2,099
2,648
2,688
3,054
5,797
9,999
10,000
40,858

statistics and metrics. Specifically, the features include quartile, min, max, average
and median statistics.
Table 4.2:
Protocol Parameters

Example Features by Category

Performance

Volume

Size

stream length
inter-arrival time
number of out-of-order packets
average packet size
average window size
throughput
number of acknowledgment packets
total bytes sent
request for max segment size round trip time
number of retransmissions
amount of control bytes set

The data set presents a complex domain with high dimensionality, varied correlation, multiple feature types and missing values. Analysis of the data sets show that
some features are redundant and/or uninformative for the classification task. Utilizing Pearson’s correlation coefficient, the feature pairs indicated in Table 4.3 have
a perfectly linear association indicated by |r| = 1. Of the pairings, only a single
member of a pair would need to be assessed for feature selection. Additionally, the
data set contains features with no utility since all their values are zero or missing.
Uninformative features are noted in Table 4.4 and may also be removed. Many pairs
of features contain extremely high correlations in excess of 0.99. For the 248 features,
there are 30,628 possible combinations of pairings. There are 74 and 326 feature pairings that have absolute correlations greater than 0.99 and 0.9, respectively. The data
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set contains features whose values are binary, whole and real numbers. Additionally,
nearly a third of values for some features are missing data.
Table 4.3: Pairs of Features with Perfect Correlation
Index A
Feature A
Index B
Feature B
6
6
198
7
7
199
217

mean IAT
mean IAT
mean IAT a b
q3 IAT
q3 IAT
q3 IAT a b
Effective Bandwidth a b

Table 4.4:
Index
76
78
103
104
106
219
229
239

198
205
205
199
206
206
218

mean IAT a b
mean IAT b a
mean IAT b a
q3 IAT a b
q3 IAT b a
q3 IAT b a
Effective Bandwidth b a

Uninformative Features
Feature
urgent data pkts b a
urgent data bytes b a
truncated data a b
truncated data b a
truncated packets b a
FFT all Frequency # 1
FFT a b Frequency # 1
FFT b a Frequency # 1

As discussed in Section 3.3, the Bhattacharyya methods do not handle redundant features. These redundant and uninformative features in Tables 4.3 and 4.4
were removed from the Bhattacharyya methods to prevent the similar ranking of
highly correlated features. All the remaining feature selection methods utilize all the
features. Except for RELIEF-F, all the other feature selection methods handle redundant features. The redundant and uninformative features should also be removed
from the RELIEF-F runs, but the RELIEF-F runs have been executed in advance
of the analysis of redundant features. Due to the amount of computational time in
reevaluating the features for 30 Monte-Carlo runs, the RELIEF-F algorithm was not
repeated without the redundant and uninformative features. Since the redundant features would be ranked similarly, the subset selected using RELIEF-F may be larger
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than if the features were excluded. In the case of this thesis, the size of the selected
subset for RELIEF-F was not affected. The redundant and uninformative features
referenced in Tables 4.3 and 4.4 do not appear in the selected subset for RELIEF-F.
Hence, there is no impact on the results of this thesis by not reevaluating the features
with RELIEF-F.
4.1.2 Experimental Parameters.

Cross validation allows for the use of in-

dependent training and test sets, while testing each sample in the set exactly once.
A single run of k-fold cross validation provides an estimation or sample of the performance of the classifier, while reducing the bias of the results [46]. By stratifying
the folds, each fold will have a near equal number of samples per class. Stratification
ensures a representative number of of each class is in all training and test sets. There
are ample samples to perform runs of a stratified 10-fold cross validation since the
reduced data set has 40,858 samples with only 2 classes containing less than 1,000
samples. This thesis assesses the performance of a classifier for a given subset of features with 30 runs of stratified 10-fold cross-validation. A run ascribes to a specific
seed that partitions the folds for the cross validation of each run. The same seeds,
integers 1 through 30, are used for all classifications and feature selection methods to
provide uniformity for comparison of performance.
Table 4.5 provides a listing of the parameters for the machine learning algorithms of interest to this work. The C4.5 decision tree parameters are based on Quinlan’s discussion [70] as described in Section 2.3.1. Mucciardi and Gose [63] provide
the POEACC parameters that perform well in their experiments. As suggested by
Kononenko [38], the simplification of using all the instances to determine the weighting is used for RELIEF-F. The parameters for the remaining algorithms (GRLVQI,
BP, classifier accuracy rate with best first (BF) search and classifier accuracy rate
with genetic algorithm) are based on experimentation, in order to find a reasonable
performance in classification performance and runtime. The GRLVQI learn schedule
refers to a reduction in the learn rates by a half and the β by 20% every 250k training
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Table 4.5:
Näive Bayes

Parameters for Machine Learning Algorithms
None
Confidence Factor
0.25
C4.5
Min Num of Objects per Leaf
2
J
In-Class Learn Rate (ǫ )
0.02
K
Out-of-Class Learn Rate (ǫ )
0.02
Relevance Learn Rate (ǫλ )
0.01
Training Steps
2M
GRLVQI
Learn Schedule
Every 250k steps
Number of Prototypes per Class
10
β for Conscience Learning
0.5
γ for Conscience Learning
2
Learning Rate
0.3
BP
Training Epochs
10
Hidden Nodes
248
Classifier
Näive Bayes
POEACC
Weight for ACC
0.9
Weight for POE
0.1
RELIEF-F
Number of Neighbors
All
Classifier
Näive Bayes
Acc Rate w/ BF Search
Direction
Forward
Amount of Backtracking
5 nodes
Classifier
Näive Bayes
Generations
20
Acc Rate w/ Genetic Algorithm
Crossover Probability
0.6
Mutation Probability
0.3
Median Bhattacharyya
None
Minimum Surface Bhattacharyya None
steps. The Näive Bayes, and median and minimum surface Bhattacharyya methods
do not require input parameters. Although, the performance of the Bhattacharyya
methods are sensitive to the binning approach taken for the comparison of histograms.
Implementations of the algorithms for this thesis may be found in the WEKA
library [87]. WEKA is a Java library of machine learning algorithms for classification, clustering and feature selection. The library includes a graphical user interface,
mechanisms for input and output of data sets, visualization of results and input
data, testing of algorithms, and ample documentation. This tool set may be used
to implement additional machine learning methods. A few algorithms, which were
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not included in the WEKA library (e.g., POEACC and GRLVQI), have been implemented to interface with the library and take advantage of the performance analysis
and reporting tools. The median and minimum surface Bhattacharyya methods are
implemented in Matlab, vice WEKA, to reduce development time. For example, Matlab contains predefined functions for generating histograms, which is used to calculate
the Bhattacharyya coefficient.
4.2

Results of Experiments
This section discusses the results and analysis in establishing and evaluating

feature subsets for intrusion detection. The subsets for each feature selection method
are quantitatively justified. Feature selection methods, which develop the subsets,
demonstrate varied capacities in identifying relevant features for the given data set.
A few subsets well describe the decision boundary by improving or maintaining performance across a varied grouping of classifiers. Trends in the classifiers are also
brought to light based on the comparative classification performances of the subsets.
4.2.1 Subset Selection for Each Feature Selection Algorithm.

By execut-

ing the method in Section 3.2.1, each feature selection method provides an ordered
list of subsets for evaluation. The subsets of a given feature selection algorithm are
referred to by the number of features in a subset. A single subset for each feature
selection algorithm is chosen based on statistically-significant classification performance with the Näive Bayes classifier (statistical significance determined as discussed
in Section 3.4.2). The leading subset where the classification performance plateaus
is selected for the feature selection method for reasons discussed in Section 3.2.2. If
a smaller subset performs statistically better or the same than the selected feature
subset, then the smaller subset is selected at the expense of the larger subset. This
section reviews the assessment of the performance for each feature selection algorithm.
Figures A.1 through A.8 in Appendix A illustrate the results and analysis of the ordered subsets’ classification performance from the following feature selection methods:
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classifier accuracy rate with best first search, Decision Tree (C4.5), classifier accuracy
rate with genetic algorithm, RELIEF-F, Probability of Error and Average Correlation Coefficient (POEACC), Generalized Relevance Learning Vector Quantization
Improved (GRLVQI), median Bhattacharyya and minimum surface Bhattacharyya
methods.
Each figure contains three plots to illustrate the results of the subsets’ performances for a given feature selection method. The (a) plots show differences in
classification performance (i.e., equal weighted accuracy (EWA)) between consecutive subsets. The difference is calculated by EW ASubset (i+1) − EW ASubset i , where i
is the number of features in a given subset. When the difference stabilizes to below
1.5% accuracy, classification performance has reached a representative plateau based
on empirical trends of the results. The leading subset of the plateau is initially selected as the selected subset for the given feature selection method. The (b) plots
provide a multiple comparison of the mean performance of subsets with normally
distributed results to demonstrate statistical significance. The (b) plots do not contain the confidence intervals because the intervals are too small for the given axis.
The confidence intervals will be referred to in relation to the mean, µEW A , when
a statistically-significant difference in performance is not clear. The (c) plots provide a multiple comparison of mean ranks with confidence intervals for comparison
of non-normally distributed results. The rank confidence intervals will be referred to
in relation to the mean rank, µrank . The family-wise rank confidence intervals may
be overly conservative and misleading since the comparison method of mean ranks
accounts for a pooled standard error in rank. Hence, analysis by rank negates large
differences in performance. Given 3 accuracies of 0.6, 0.9 and 0.91, the ranks are 1,
2 and 3, respectively. If there is a significant overlap of numerous subsets of close
performance the family-wise rank confidence interval becomes tremendous in comparison with the actual difference in performance. Alternate methods of analysis may
be required for these cases (e.g., a paired hypothesis test or a multiple comparison of
a smaller subset of features).

4-8

Difference in Performance
Figure 4.1:

Difference in Performance among Adjacent Subsets
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Subset 11
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100
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The classification performance of ordered subsets, generated by accuracy rate with best first search, stabilizes at subset 11. Based on the
given feature selection and classification method, subset 11 contains the
most important features

The results in Figure A.1 and interpretation for the classifier accuracy rate with
best first search are discussed in detail below. The three plots in Figure A.1 are included in this section (e.g., Figures 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3). Figure 4.1 shows the difference
in performance from adjacent subsets by the number of features in a given subset for
classifier accuracy rate with best first search. The smallest subset generated contains
three features and the classification performance changes significantly for successive
subsets. The classification performance stabilizes below 1.5% starting with subset
11. Subset 11 is initially selected as the feature subset for classifier accuracy rate
with best first search. Based on the given feature selection and classification method,
subset 11 contains the most important features, but statistical analsyis determines
whether it is the smallest set of important features.
For classifier accuracy rate with best first search, subset 11 is compared to
smaller subsets to determine whether it provides improved classification performance
with statistical significance. All results for feature subsets smaller than subset 11 are
normally distributed, except for subset 10. Figure 4.2 shows the mean classification
performance by the number of features in a subset. For the figure, the family-wise
confidence interval is µEW A ±8.863×10−4 . With such a tight interval, no subset smaller
than subset 11 has a classification performance that approaches the performance of
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Multiple comparison of the mean ranks in classification performance
is used to determine statistically-significant differences of non-normally
distributed results for ordered subsets from accuracy rate with best first
search. Subset 10 is the only non-normally distributed subset smaller
than Subset 11

subset 11. Hence, the classification performance results from subset 11 perform better
than all the smaller, normally distributed subsets with statistical significance.
Subset 10 is non-normally distributed so analysis of statistical significance using
rank is appropriate. Figure 4.3 illustrates the rank-based multiple comparison with
confidence intervals. Based on the classification performance rank intervals, subsets
10 and 11 clearly overlap so the results are not statistically different from this perspective. Based on the large difference in mean EWA, a lack of statistical significance is
counterintuitive. The family-wise rank confidence interval in this case is too conserva-
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tive to make an accurate determination of statistical significance. A paired Wilcoxon
signed rank test shows the results for subsets 10 and 11 do not have equal classification performance with statistical significance, p-value = 1.7235 × 10−6 . Based on the
given feature selection and classification method, subset 11 contains the smallest set
of important features.
The analysis for the remaining figures (feature selection methods) are analogous to that of the classifier accuracy rate with best first search method. They are
summarized below:
• Decision Tree (C4.5): Figure A.2 (a) illustrates that the results stabilize at
subset 23. Figure A.2 (b) shows the mean performances are clearly less than
subset 23 for smaller subsets. Figure A.2 (c) shows no overlap below subset 23.
• Classifier accuracy rate with Genetic algorithm: Figure A.3 (a) illustrates that
the results stabilize at subset 12. Figure A.3 (b) shows the mean performances
are clearly less than subset 12 for smaller subsets. Figure A.3 (c) shows no
overlap below subset 12.
• RELIEF-F: Figure A.4 (a) illustrates that the results stabilize at subset 19.
Figure A.4 (b) shows the mean performances are clearly less than subset 19 for
smaller subsets. Figure A.4 (c) shows no overlap below subset 19.
• POEACC: Figure A.5 (a) shows the performance stabilize at subset 86. Due
to the poor performance of the feature selection method, many redundant and
uninformative features are ranked high. One must relax the 1.5% difference
among adjacent subsets to obtain a comparably-sized subset that captures the
most relevant features. Subset 12 may be selected with a difference of approximately 5%. Figure A.5 (b) shows the nearest performer to subset 12 is subset
11 and a statistically-significant difference is not clear. The confidence interval around the mean is µEW A ± 1.4 × 10−3 . The upper and lower ends of the
confidence intervals for subsets 11 and 12 are µEW A + interval = 0.6783 and
µEW A − interval = 0.6904, respectively. Hence, there is no overlap of the inter4-11

vals. Subsets one to four have non-normally distributed results. The multiple
comparison among all the subsets is too conservative so Figure A.5 (c) shows a
multiple comparison between subset 12 and smaller subsets. There is no overlap
with subsets one to four.
• GRLVQI: Figure A.6 (a) illustrates that the results stabilize at subset 27. Figure A.6 (b) shows the mean performances are clearly less than subset 27 for
smaller subsets. Non-normally distributed results include subsets 1-5, 6, and
12. Figure A.6 (c) shows no overlap with subsets 1-5, 6, and 12 with subset 27.
• Median Bhattacharyya: Figure A.7 (a) illustrates the results do not stabilize
until after a severe reduction in performance at subset 71. The subset with
the best classification performance below subset 71 is subset 23. Figure A.7
(b) is unclear whether there is an overlap of the confidence intervals. The
nearest performer to subset 23 (µEW A −interval = 0.8692) is subset 22 (µEW A +
interval = 0.8668) and there is no overlap of the intervals. The non-normally
distributed results below subset 23 include subsets 1, 2, 6, and 8. Figure A.7
(c) shows no overlap of rank confidence intervals between subset 23 and the
non-normally distributed results.
• Minimum Surface Bhattacharyya: Figure A.8 (a) illustrates that the results
stabilize at subset 16. Figure A.8 (b) shows the mean performances are clearly
less than subset 16 for smaller subsets. Figure A.8 (c) shows no overlap of subset
16 with non-Normal results from subsets 1, 5, and 9.
Table 4.6 compares the selected subset sizes for each feature selection method
discussed and subsets generated from two additional feature selection methods from
Auld [2] and Moore [60]. The two additional subsets were generated, by Bayesian
Neural Network Feature-Interdependent Ranking (BNN) and Fast Correlation-Based
Filter (FCBF) methods, from the features in Appendix B, except port numbers. All
of the feature selection methods drastically reduce the dimensions of the feature set.
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Section 4.2.2 compares the performance of the subsets with four classifiers: Näive
Bayes, C4.5, multilayer perceptron with backpropogation (BP), and GRLVQI.
Table 4.6: Performance of Selected Subsets
Feature Selection Method
Number of Selected Features
Best First
Decision Tree (C4.5)
Genetic
RELIEF-F
POEACC
GRLVQI
BNN [2]
FCBF [2, 60]
Bhattacharyya-median sort
Bhattacharyya-min surface sort
None (All Features)

4.2.2 Subset Comparison by Classifier.

11
23
12
19
12
27
20
10
23
16
248

Figures A.9 through A.12 in Ap-

pendix A illustrate the multiple comparisons of the selected subsets’ performances
for the Näive Bayes, C4.5, BP, and GRLVQI classifiers. The analysis treats the performance of all the features for a given classifier as a baseline. Performance is based
on an improvement or decline in EWA for the subsets selected for each feature selection method in relation to the baseline. The (a) plots show comparison of means with
family-wise confidence intervals. The (b) plots show mean ranks with family-wise rank
confidence intervals. A similar issue with the multiple comparison of ranks results in
overly-conservative rank confidence intervals for non-normally distributed results. A
paired hypothesis test may be required for non-normally distributed results. The
subsets generating non-normally distributed results for a given classification method
are listed below:
• Näive Bayes: C4.5 and FCBF
• C4.5: Accuracy rate with genetic algorithm and median Bhattacharyya
• BP: none
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Multiple comparison of the mean ranks in Näive Bayes classifier performance is used to determine statistically-significant differences of nonnormally distributed results for selected subsets. The method is overly
conservative for the non-normally distributed results from C4.5 and
FCBF feature selection methods

• GRLVQI: C4.5
The only case, where the figures do not provide an accurate representation of
the results, is for the non-normally distributed results for the Näive Bayes classifier in
Figure 4.4. The results generated by subsets from C4.5 and FCBF feature selection
methods are non-normally distributed. Wilcoxon signed rank tests between the results
of C4.5 and All Features, and FCBF and All Features show unequal performance.
Each of the two tests has a p-value equal to 1.73 × 10−6 . The subset from the C4.5
method has a better performance and the FCBF has a worse performance than the
baseline of All Features.
As indicated by Table 4.7, most of the feature selection methods provide a degree of generality in the selected subsets. The far-left column of the table lists the
feature selection method from which a given subset is generated. The remaining two
columns provide a count of the number of classifiers, where the selected subset has
outperformed or maintained performance in respect to all the features with statistical significance. Only the subset generated by the RELIEF-F algorithm improved or
maintained performance for all of the classifiers. The RELIEF-F algorithm weights
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the features based on the nearest distance from in-class and out-of-class samples along
a given dimension (feature). Interestingly, GRLVQI updates feature weightings based
on distances to the nearest in-class and out-of-class samples and its selected subset provides good generality by improving or maintaining performance for three out
of the four classifiers. Surprisingly, the subset generated from GRLVQI improved
performance for every classifier except itself. Ranking the features, based on the
Bhattacharyya coefficient, provides a slightly different distance measure approach,
which seeks to determine the difference between classes for a given feature. Both
methods utilizing Bhattacharyya coefficients improve performance for three classifiers. Regardless of specific approach, this shows distance to be a reliable measure for
analyzing features for this data set. The methods that do not perform well for the
intent of generality is classifier accuracy rate with best first search, POEACC, and
the two methods taken from papers, BNN and FCBF. The feature selection method
utilizing accuracy rate with best first search improved performance for a single classifier (Näive Bayes), while maintaining classification performance for another classifier
(C4.5). Even though POEACC improved and maintained classification performance
for two classifiers (GRLVQI and C4.5, respectively), POEACC performed near the
worst of the feature selection methods across all of the classifiers. The subsets from
BNN and FCBF clearly do not provide generality by improving classification performance for one classifier (GRLVQI). The methods do not to include server and client
ports in their subsets (BNN and FCBF), which demonstrates the importance of ports
for the classification task.
Nearly every selected subset increased performance for the Näive Bayes classifier
as illustrated in Figure A.9. The feature subsets not containing port numbers, BNN
and FCBF, reduced performance approximately 30%. For the most part, the performance of the Näive Bayes classifier is highly susceptible to the included features. Even
though most feature subsets increase performance, the increase is highly varied from
3% to 12%. The method utilizing accuracy rate with best first search performs well
in optimizing a minimal set of features (11) and increases the Näive Bayes classifica-
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Table 4.7: Performance of Selected Subsets in Relation to All Features
Feature Selection Method
Outperform
Equal Performance
Best First
Decision Tree (C4.5)
Genetic
RELIEF-F
POEACC
GRLVQI
BNN [2]
FCBF [2, 60]
Bhattacharyya-median sort
Bhattacharyya-min surface sort

(Number of Classifiers) (Number of Classifiers)
1
1
3
0
2
1
2
2
1
1
2
1
1
0
1
0
3
0
3
0

tion performance by 10%. This is entirely reasonable since the heuristic used in the
search is the accuracy from the Näive Bayes classifier. This is an example of a feature
selection method optimizing for a given classifier. One may suspect that classifier accuracy rate with a genetic algorithm would result in a similar or better optimization
for the Näive Bayes classifier. This likely do not occur because of the small number
of generations and high mutation rate used for parameters. These parameters are not
ideal for optimizing the search; they are used to reduce the search time and broaden
the search space within the limited number of generations. In this case, the genetic
search parameters result in a the smallest subset with good generality.
Figure A.10 shows the C4.5 classifier maintain outstanding performance across
all the subsets. Even the worst performers (e.g., BNN and FCBF), have EWAs greater
than 90%. Only the subsets generated from the Decision Tree and Bhattacharyya
selection methods improved performance. The C4.5 classifier is robustly consistent
regardless of the selected subset with most subsets providing EWA performance in
excess of 98%.
The BP is stridently resilient to improvement in classification performance. Figure A.11 shows that no feature subset improved classification performance, which is
consistent with Auld [2]. Two subsets (e.g., RELIEF-F and GRLVQI) maintained
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performance with the entire feature set. Three other subsets (e.g., accuracy rate with
best first search, Decision Tree, and accuracy rate with a genetic algorithm) provided
mean performance within 2% of that of all the features. The subsets generated by
mean and minimum surface Bhattacharyya methods had performance within 4% of all
the features. As discussed in Section 2.2.2, BP performs well with noisy and incomplete data so the consistent classification performance from the subsets demonstrates
the traits of the classifier.
Performance of GRLVQI is dramatically improved by feature selection with this
data set as illustrated by Figure A.12. This susceptibility to the feature set is not
intuitive since GRLVQI preferentiates features based on classification performance.
Two subsets hindered performance to include the subset generated by GRLVQI as the
feature selection method and accuracy rate with best first search. The results suggest
that the relevance initialization or update approaches for GRLVQI is suboptimal for
its own learning paradigm with this data set. Perhaps, initially weighting the features
by their normalized median Bhattacharyya measure between classes or RELIEF-F
weighting would be beneficial in guiding the the creation of the domain boundary,
vice an equal weighting for all features.
Table A.1 lists the features by the feature selection method. The most commonly
selected features include server and client ports, size of the packets/segment sizes, and
window sizes/advertisements. Less commonly selected features include Internet Protocol (IP) indicators (e.g., synchronization, acknowledgment, request packets), and
timing (e.g., inter-arrival time, round trip time, and idle time). An important question to answer is why the selected features improve performance. Feature selection
methods identify features, which characterize unique connection traits of the network
traffic classes and provide separability between the classes for classification. For example, the subset generated via RELIEF-F demonstrated generality for all the classifiers
and the features provide separability among the classes, as indicated by their Bhattacharyya coefficient. Of the features selected using RELIEF-F, 16 out of 19 features
have mean Bhattacharyya coefficients less than 0.5 for all combinations of classes.
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Additionally, the results demonstrate that the RELIEF-F algorithm performs poorly
in handling highly correlated features. The RELIEF-F rankings of highly correlated
data are similar.
In general terms, the selected features provide a relevant representation of the
domain space and boundaries as reinforced by research into the characteristics of
network traffic. Many of the selected features may be deduced based on the behavior
of flow types. A more detailed discussion on established flow characteristics and their
validation of the generality of the selected features follows.
4.3

Validation of Results
Self-identification of network service via client and server ports is ranked high

for every feature selection method. For good reason, the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) has defined well-known server ports (server ports less than
1,024) to a defined network service. Furthermore, IANA registers ports for proprietary applications and those server ports range from 1,024 to 49,151 [51]. A server
configured appropriately will accept connections for a given service on the predefined
port. Hence, the server port feature will correctly define the application in most cases.
An exception is for the FTP protocol where the server initiates the connection for
data transfer on port 20. In this case, the “server” sending the data is considered a
client in respect to the connection and port 20 is assigned to the client port feature
of a FTP-data flow. In addition, network attacks target specific services (e.g., the
deloader worm and MS SQL-snake worm connect on ports 445 and 1433, respectively)
so the port number may also be used in identifying the type of attack or conceal the
attack among regular traffic [88]. Some peer to peer (P2P) traffic utilize predefined
ports (e.g., BitTorrent operates on server ports 6881 to 6889). Other P2P applications have grown more elusive and operate on any port number and attempt to
conceal the application by operating on port 80 [34]. Reliance on port numbers will
lead to misclassifications and studies have shown other important characteristics to
describe traffic.
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The foremost characteristic of P2P traffic aside from port numbers is packet
size [34] (e.g., features 11-23, 81-84, 153-166, 174-187). Differing P2P applications
implement varied packet sizes for control packets to manage and search its overlay
network. The P2P control packet size may be an indicator, aside from maintaining
a high rate of packets that meet the maximum segment size. P2P networks are
notorious for utilizing a significant amount of bandwidth over the Internet backbone.
A likely indicator is the amount of bytes sent and the effective bandwidth of a flow
(e.g., features 43-44, 47-48, 216-218).
Lakhina, et al. [41] provide ample discussion on the characteristics of network
anomalies, of which attacks are a subset. Denial of Service (DOS) attacks become
evident by the number of packets in a flow and the number of flows between a host
pair. Furthermore, DOS attacks typically target a given IP address or small set of IP
addresses. A high number flows between hosts are indicative of features that monitor
the number of packets (e.g., features 31, 32) and a low time since a last connection,
feature 209. The high rate of packets in a given flow suggests a low inter-arrival time
(e.g., features 3-9, 195-208) and low idle time (e.g., features 109, 110).
A large number of IP flows to multiple ports is characteristic of scanning. Like
a DOS attack, a low time since last connection is indicative of multiple connections
between two hosts. Scanning is also a short-lived activity that takes advantage of undocumented events in network protocols to evade firewalls. For example, a connection
may be initiated with an acknowledgment packet, vice the expected synchronization
packet. Informative features may be stream length or duration (e.g features 99-100,
107-108). The data set strictly contains full TCP connections that begin with a synchronization packet so such methods of scanning are not included. Self-propagating
worms target a given vulnerability over a set port with a large spike in packets to
spread the worm. The features discussed should provide fidelity in characterizing
worms.
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The features do not provide indicators for analyzing unsuccessful or incomplete connections. These characteristics correspond to attacks such as synchronization flooding, scans and network mapping. A problem from the intrusion detection
perspective is that the feature set focuses on flow-level characteristics. Ren, et al. [72]
shows how network-level trends of synchronization and acknowledgment packets, time,
port numbers and IP addresses may be used in intrusion detection.
4.4

Summary
Only a single algorithm, RELEIF-F, demonstrate generality of the selected fea-

ture set based on classification performance on all four classifiers. Five other feature
selection methods (e.g., Decision Tree, accuracy rate with a genetic algorithm, GRLVQI, mean Bhattacharyya, and minimum surface Bhattacharyya methods) show
good generality by maintaining classification performance on three of the classifiers
and a majority of them nearly met performance for a fourth classifier. The decision
boundary may be well described with 12 to 27 features, while providing significant
improvement to classification performance in some cases. The proposed minimum
surface Bhattacharyya method generates the second smallest subset of 16 with good
generality. Accuracy rate with genetic search creates the smallest subset with good
generality.
The (a) plots from Figures A.3 through A.8 in Appendix A demonstrate that
the feature selection algorithms (e.g., accuracy rate with genetic algorithm, RELIEFF, GRLVQI, median Bhattacharyya and minimum surface Bhattacharyya methods)
that generated features with generality displayed a unique behavior. The performance
reaches a climax with small subsets sizes and tappers off to a worse performance with
large subset sizes. The feature selection methods that do not demonstrate generality
in their selected features (e.g., accuracy rate with best first search and POEACC)
illustrate different characteristics in their subset performance charts. Plot (a) of
Figures A.1 and A.5 show a consistent increase or stable performance as the ordered
subsets become larger. The climax and plateau illustrates an appropriate ordering of
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the most relevant features first followed by features that serve as distractors or redundant features. Figure A.5 for the POEACC algorithm illustrates a poor performing
feature selection algorithm for the data set with the performance increasing until
large subsets. It would be intriguing to observe the performance by subset graphs of
the other classification methods. Is the climax an attribute of the ordered features
or the Näive Bayes classifier? Do the performances plateau at similar subsets sizes?
Additionally, one may rank the selected features in Table A.1 and assess the ordered
subsets as discussed in Section 3.2.
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V. Conclusions
The goal of this thesis is to assess relevant features for the purpose of intrusion
detection on a computer network. The relevant features may allow for improved classification performance for real-time or post-analysis of network traffic. In order to
perform the task, a review of the taxonomy of feature selection algorithms and intrusion detection methods are discussed. Prevalent methods in the machine learning
intrusion detection field of study are incorporated into the methodology to include
a diverse group of feature selection and classification methods. Additionally, an extension to utilizing separability as a feature selection method is proposed. The thesis
outlines a set of features and feature types relevant to the intrusion detection task and
provides quantitative justification by means of classification performance and qualitative validation from works characterizing network traffic. Specific features have been
demonstrated to provide ample characterization of the decision boundary for classification. The feature selection methods analyzed include accuracy rate with best
first search, Decision Tree (C4.5), accuracy rate with a genetic algorithm, RELIEFF, Probability of Error and Average Correlation Coefficient (POEACC), Generalized
Relevance Learning Vector Quantization Improved (GRLVQI), median Bhattacharyya
and minimum surface Bhattacharyya methods.
5.1

Summary of Results
For a selection of real traffic flows, the results of this thesis demonstrate mul-

tiple feature subsets that drastically reduce the size of a feature set while providing
ample generality to describe the domain and enhance performance for some classifiers. The figures in Appendix A illustrate several trends for the feature selection and
classification methods like confirmation of the hypothesis that classification performance plateaus with added features. Six feature selection methods provide subsets
with a degree of generality. Although, if one applied a distinct approach for selecting
larger subsets, from the feature selection methods, generality would be found with
more feature selection methods. The RELIEF-F feature selection method generates a
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subset with generality across all the classifiers. The minimum surface Bhattacharyya
method generates the second smallest set of features to describe the decision boundary
well. Where the POEACC algorithm regularly performs near the bottom of the pack.
Accuracy with best first search demonstrates its capacity in selecting the smallest feature set (11), while optimizing the performance of a given classifier. Based on review
of the selected feature subsets, the key feature characteristics required for generality
include ports, packet size, timing attributes, and other protocol-specific indicators.
Analysis of evaluations into network traffic characteristics support the finding of this
thesis.
Unintentionally, the thesis also acts as a survey of common classification methods. Contrary to some prior work, the C4.5 demonstrates very good classification
across all of the network traffic classes. Previous work implementing C4.5 and other
decision trees show mixed results in classifying network services and attacks on simulated and real traffic [1, 21, 43]. A majority of the works utilize the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology Lincoln (MIT) Laboratory data set discussed in Section 4.1.1
and show relatively poor accuracy for all attack types except Denial of Service attacks.
Sabhnani [77] argues that the poor detection performance of some attack types is due
to deficiencies in the MIT data set. This thesis shows a clear performance advantage
for C4.5 classifiers, versus alternate methods, with an equal weighted accuracy performance of 98%. The attack types, in this thesis, consitute worms and viruses at a
high accuracy, where Agosta [1] demonstrates classification accuracies ranging from
57% to 88% in detecting worms on a homemade data set.
5.2

Contributions
This work provides several contributions to the field of intrusion detection and

machine learning. First, generality has been shown for a relatively small subset of
features to describe the classification decision boundary of Transmission Control Protocol flows. A second smallest set of 16 features may be extracted in real-time or near
real-time to improve the performance of anomaly detection methods utilizing varied
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machine learning techniques. Second, the C4.5 decision tree classification method
has been shown to perform well on real traffic with worms and viruses consisting of
the labeled attack traffic. The decision tree may be simply interpreted to develop
fast and understandable rule sets for implementation in an expert intrusion detection
system. Lastly, an extension, minimum surface Bhattacharyya method, to a current
feature selection method demonstrates comparable performance with other methods,
while minimizing the size of the feature subset. The minimum surface Bhattacharyya
method takes advantage of the intrinsic separability with a data set for multiple class
problems, optimizing selection of the most separable features across all class-pair combinations. Additionally, the minimum surface Bhattacharyya method runs with a low
time complexity in comparison to other feature selection methods.
5.3

Recommendations for Future Work
To improve upon current classification and feature selection methods for intru-

sion detection, a data set is required with ground truth knowledge of the sub-classes
constituting the attack class. Development of a data set containing, a broad spectrum
of attack types would be ideal. Flows of known attacks may be monitored on an isolated network to obtain the required breadth. Then, the flows from varying sources
could be combined to develop a data set with a combination of wild, genuine flows of
network services and a plethora of attack types.
In regards to the classification algorithms implemented, there are several unanswered questions which may improve understanding of the algorithms and the domain.
For the C4.5 algorithm, there are multiple types of evaluation measure and pruning
methods that may be implemented. Is there an optimal measure for segmenting the
network flow domain space for classification? The feature evaluation methods showed
class-based distance to be effective. For the GRLVQI algorithm, evaluation of alternative feature relevance update methods appears to be warranted. A performance
comparison of all features with subsets in Figure A.12 illustrates improved performance for multiple subsets selected from alternate means.
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Numerous papers [11, 62, 81] argue that machine learning provides an effective
anomaly detection capability. The capability of machine learning algorithms to truly
detect anomalous behavior has not been shown empirically. A basic premise for machine learning classifiers requires testing on unseen samples to provide an estimation
of the performance of a learned model. A rarely tested hypothesis is the capability
to identify unseen attack types [42]. One may develop a training and test set, where
the test set contains attack types that are left out of the training set. Successful
classification with the feature subset of unseen attacks provides strong evidence of
the functionality and the robustness of a feature set and classification technique.
Lastly, the burden of obtaining genuine, labeled network traffic and attacks for
analysis would likely be too difficult or involved a task for a production anomaly
detector. Additionally, detecting traffic in the wild and trying to label after the
fact induces error and limits the traffic to that observed over a given network. The
analysis of the effectiveness of training on simulated traffic would be of great benefit
in employing a production anomaly detection system based on machine learning. This
effort would require work in developing traffic models and validating the effectiveness
of classifiers trained on simulated traffic by testing on real network traffic.
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Appendix A. Feature Selection Results
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Figure A.1:

Feature Selection: accuracy rate with best first search. Analysis of
the plots determines a single subset for accuracy rate with best first
search. Plot (a) illustrates where the performance plateaus. Plot (b)
and (c) provide a multiple comparison of classification performance for
determining statistically-significant differences for normally and nonnormally distributed results, respectively
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Figure A.2:

Feature Selection: decision tree method. Analysis of the plots determines a single subset for decision tree method (C4.5). Plot (a)
illustrates where the performance plateaus. Plot (b) and (c) provide
a multiple comparison of classification performance for determining
statistically-significant differences for normally and non-normally distributed results, respectively
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Figure A.3:

Feature Selection: accuracy rate with genetic algorithm. Analysis of
the plots determines a single subset for accuracy rate with genetic algorithm. Plot (a) illustrates where the performance plateaus. Plot (b)
and (c) provide a multiple comparison of classification performance for
determining statistically-significant differences for normally and nonnormally distributed results, respectively
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Figure A.4:

Feature Selection: Analysis of the plots determines a single subset
for RELIEF-F. Plot (a) illustrates where the performance plateaus.
Plot (b) and (c) provide a multiple comparison of classification performance for determining statistically-significant differences for normally
and non-normally distributed results, respectively
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Figure A.5:

Feature Selection: probability of error and average correlation coefficient (POEACC). Analysis of the plots determines a single subset
for POEACC. Plot (a) illustrates where the performance plateaus.
Plot (b) and (c) provide a multiple comparison of classification performance for determining statistically-significant differences for normally
and non-normally distributed results, respectively
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Figure A.6:

Feature Selection: Generalized Relevance Learning Vector Quantization Improved (GRLVQI). Analysis of the plots determines a single subset for GRLVQI. Plot (a) illustrates where the performance plateaus.
Plot (b) and (c) provide a multiple comparison of classification performance for determining statistically-significant differences for normally
and non-normally distributed results, respectively
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Figure A.7:

Feature Selection: Median Bhattacharyya. Analysis of the plots determines a single subset for Median Bhattacharyya. Plot (a) illustrates
where the performance plateaus. Plot (b) and (c) provide a multiple
comparison of classification performance for determining statisticallysignificant differences for normally and non-normally distributed results, respectively
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Figure A.8:

Feature Selection: Minimum Surface Bhattacharyya. Analysis of the
plots determines a single subset for Minimum Surface Bhattacharyya.
Plot (a) illustrates where the performance plateaus. Plot (b) and
(c) provide a multiple comparison of classification performance for
determining statistically-significant differences for normally and nonnormally distributed results, respectively
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Figure A.9:

Comparison of Selected Subsets: Näive Bayes Classifier. Compares
Näive Bayes classifier performance of selected subsets with the entire
feature set to determine, which subsets improve performance. Plot (a)
and (b) provide a multiple comparison of classification performance for
determining statistically-significant differences for normally and nonnormally distributed results, respectively
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Figure A.10:

Comparison of Selected Subsets: C4.5 Classifier. Compares C4.5 classifier performance of selected subsets with the entire feature set to determine, which subsets improve performance. Plot (a) and (b) provide
a multiple comparison of classification performance for determining
statistically-significant differences for normally and non-normally distributed results, respectively
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Figure A.11:

Performance of Subsets

Comparison of Selected Subsets: multilayer perceptron with backpropogation (BP) Classifier. Compares BP classifier performance of
selected subsets with the entire feature set to determine, which subsets
improve performance. Plot provides a multiple comparison of classification performance for determining statistically-significant differences
for normally distributed results

A-12

0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5

Be
st
Fi
rs
t
C
4.
G 5
e
R net
EL ic
IE
F
PO −F
EA
C
Bh GR C
L
Bh at
at t (m VQ
I
t(
m edi
in
a
su n)
rfa
ce
)
BN
N
Al FC
l F BF
ea
tu
re
s

Mean Equal Weighted Accuracy

Performance of Subsets

(a)

Performance Rank of Subsets

R
e
EL tic
IE
F
PO −F
EA
C
Bh GR C
L
Bh at
at t (m VQ
I
t(
m edi
in
a
su n)
rfa
ce
)
BN
N
Al FC
l F BF
ea
tu
re
s

4.
5

C

en
G

Be

st

0

t

200

Fi
rs

Mean Rank

400

(b)

Figure A.12:

Comparison of Selected Subsets: Generalized Relevance Learning Vector Quantization Improved (GRLVQI) Classifier. Compares GRLVQI
classifier performance of selected subsets with the entire feature set to
determine, which subsets improve performance. Plot (a) and (b) provide a multiple comparison of classification performance for determining statistically-significant differences for normally and non-normally
distributed results, respectively
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Table A.1:
Feature Description
Server Port
Client Port
min IAT
var IAT
q1 data wire
med data wire
mean data wire
max data wire
mean data ip
max data ip
min data control
med data control
max data control
var data control
ack pkts sent b a
pure acks sent a b
sack pkts sent a b
dsack pkts sent b a
unique bytes sent a b
actual data pkts a b
zwnd probe pkts a b
zwnd probe bytes b a
pushed data pkts a b
pushed data pkts b a
SYN pkts sent a b
req 1323 ts a b
req 1323 ws b a
req 1323 ts b a
req sack a b
req sack b a
mss requested a b
mss requested b a
max segm size a b
max segm size b a
min segm size a b
min segm size b a
avg segm size a b
avg segm size b a
max win adv a b
max win adv b a
min win adv b a
zero win adv a b
zero win adv b a
avg win adv a b
avg win adv b a
initial window-bytes a b
initial window-bytes b a
initial window-packets a b
truncated packets a b
data xmit time b a
idle time max a b
idle time max b a
throughput a b
throughput b a
RTT samples a b
RTT min a b
RTT max a b
RTT stdv a b
RTT from 3WHS b a
RTT full sz max a b
RTT full sz stdev a b
RTT full sz stdev b a
post-loss acks b a
segs cum acked a b
mean data wire a b
q3 data wire a b
max data wire a b
min data ip a b
med data ip a b
mean data ip a b
max data ip a b
q1 data control a b
med data control a b
mean data control a b
q3 data control a b
max data control a b
min data wire b a
mean data wire b a
q3 data wire b a
max data wire b a
var data wire b a
min data ip b a
med data ip b a
mean data ip b a
max data ip b a
q1 data control b a
var data control b a
q3 IAT b a
Time since last connection
No. transitions bulk/trans
Time spent idle
FFT Frequency#3 b a

Selected Subsets by Feature Selection Method

Index BestFirst C4.5
1
x
x
2
x
x
3
9
11
x
12
13
15
x
x
20
22
24
26
29
30
34
35
37
40
43
x
45
53
56
59
60
61
66
67
68
x
71
x
72
79
x
80
x
81
82
83
x
84
x
85
86
87
x
88
x
90
x
91
x
92
x
93
94
95
x
96
97
x
x
105
108
109
110
111
112
x
113
115
x
117
x
121
x
124
x
129
133
134
136
137
x
156
157
158
160
162
163
x
165
168
169
170
171
172
174
x
177
178
179
x
180
181
x
183
184
186
189
x
194
206
209
210
x
214
241

Genetic RELIEF-F
x
x
x
x

x

POEACC GRLVQI Median Bhatt Min Surf Bhatt BNN [2]
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

FCBF [2, 60]

x
x
x

x
x
x

x
x
x
x
x

x

x
x
x
x
x

x
x

x
x
x

x

x

x
x
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x
x
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Index
1
2
3
9
11
12
13
15
20
22
24
26
29
30
34
35
37
40
43
45
53
56
59
60
61
66
67
68
71
72
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
90
91
92
93
94
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110
111
112
113
115
117
121
124
129
133
134
136
137
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158
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168
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171
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180
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184
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194
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209
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Appendix B. List of Features from [61]
Number

Short

Long

1

Server Port

Port Number at server; we can establish server and client ports as we limit
ourselves to flows for which we see the initial connection set-up.

2

Client Port

Port Number at client

3

min IAT

Minimum packet inter-arrival time for all packets of the flow (considering

4

q1 IAT

First quartile inter-arrival time

5

med IAT

Median inter-arrival time

6

mean IAT

Mean inter-arrival time

7

q3 IAT

Third quartile packet inter-arrival time

8

max IAT

Maximum packet inter-arrival time

9

var IAT

Variance in packet inter-arrival time

10

min data wire

Minimum of bytes in (Ethernet) packet, using the size of the packet on the

both directions).

wire.
11

q1 data wire

First quartile of bytes in (Ethernet) packet

12

med data wire

Median of bytes in (Ethernet) packet

13

mean data wire

Mean of bytes in (Ethernet) packet

14

q3 data wire

Third quartile of bytes in (Ethernet) packet

15

max data wire

Maximum of bytes in (Ethernet) packet

16

var data wire

Variance of bytes in (Ethernet) packet

17

min data ip

Minimum of total bytes in IP packet, using the size of payload declared by

18

q1 data ip

First quartile of total bytes in IP packet

19

med data ip

Median of total bytes in IP packet

20

mean data ip

Mean of total bytes in IP packet

21

q3 data ip

Third quartile of total bytes in IP packet

22

max data ip

Maximum of total bytes in IP packet

23

var data ip

Variance of total bytes in IP packet

24

min data control

Minimum of control bytes in packet, size of the (IP/TCP) packet header

25

q1 data control

First quartile of control bytes in packet

26

med data control

Median of control bytes in packet

27

mean data control

Mean of control bytes in packet

28

q3 data control

Third quartile of control bytes in packet

29

max data control

Maximum of control bytes in packet

30

var data control

Variance of control bytes packet

the IP packet

B-1

Number

Short

Long

31

total packets a b

The total number of packets seen (client (a) to server (b)).

32

total packets b a

33

ack pkts sent a b

34

ack pkts sent b a

35

pure acks sent a b

(server (b) to client (a))
The total number of ack packets seen (TCP segments seen with the ACK bit
set) (client (a) to server (b)).
(server (b) to client (a))
The total number of ack packets seen that were not piggy-backed with data
(just the TCP header and no TCP data payload) and did not have any of the
SYN/FIN/RST flags set (client (a) to server (b))

36

pure acks sent b a

37

sack pkts sent a b

38

sack pkts sent b a

39

dsack pkts sent a b

(server (b) to client (a))
The total number of ack packets seen carrying TCP SACK [6] blocks (client
(a) to server (b))
(server (b) to client (a))
The total number of sack packets seen that carried duplicate SACK (D-SACK)
[7] blocks. (client (a) to server (b))

40

dsack pkts sent b a

41

max sack blks/ack a b

42

max sack blks/ack b a

43

unique bytes sent a b

(server (b) to client (a))
The maximum number of sack blocks seen in any sack packet. (client (a) to
server (b))
(server (b) to client (a))
The number of unique bytes sent, i.e., the total bytes of data sent excluding
retransmitted bytes and any bytes sent doing window probing. (client (a) to
server (b))

44

unique bytes sent b a

45

actual data pkts a b

46

actual data pkts b a

47

actual data bytes a b

(server (b) to client (a))
The count of all the packets with at least a byte of TCP data payload. (client
(a) to server (b))
(server (b) to client (a))
The total bytes of data seen. Note that this includes bytes from retransmissions / window probe packets if any. (client (a) to server (b))

48

actual data bytes b a

49

rexmt data pkts a b

(server (b) to client (a))
The count of all the packets found to be retransmissions. (client (a) to server
(b))

50

rexmt data pkts b a

51

rexmt data bytes a b

52

rexmt data bytes b a

53

zwnd probe pkts a b

(server (b) to client (a))
The total bytes of data found in the retransmitted packets. (client (a) to
server (b))
(server (b) to client (a))
The count of all the window probe packets seen. (Window probe packets are
typically sent by a sender when the receiver last advertised a zero receive
window, to see if the window has opened up now). (client (a) to server (b))

B-2

Number

Short

54

zwnd probe pkts b a

55

zwnd probe bytes a b

Long
(server (b) to client (a))
The total bytes of data sent in the window probe packets. (client (a) to server
(b))

56

zwnd probe bytes b a

57

outoforder pkts a b

58

outoforder pkts b a

59

pushed data pkts a b

60

pushed data pkts b a

61

SYN pkts sent a b

(server (b) to client (a))
The count of all the packets that were seen to arrive out of order. (client (a)
to server (b))
(server (b) to client (a))
The count of all the packets seen with the PUSH bit set in the TCP header.
(client (a) to server (b))
(server (b) to client (a))
The count of all the packets seen with the SYN bits set in the TCP header
respectively (client (a) to server (b))

62

FIN pkts sent a b

The count of all the packets seen with the FIN bits set in the TCP header
respectively (client (a) to server (b))

63

SYN pkts sent b a

The count of all the packets seen with the SYN bits set in the TCP header
respectively (server (b) to client (a))

64

FIN pkts sent b a

The count of all the packets seen with the FIN bits set in the TCP header
respectively (server (b) to client (a))

65

req 1323 ws a b

If the endpoint requested Window Scaling/Time Stamp options as specified
in RFC 1323[8] a Y is printed on the respective field. If the option was not
requested, an N is printed. For example, an N/Y in this field means that the
window-scaling option was not specified, while the Time-stamp option was
specified in the SYN segment. (client (a) to server (b))

66

req 1323 ts a b

. . .

67

req 1323 ws b a

If the endpoint requested Window Scaling/Time Stamp options as specified
in RFC 1323[8] a Y is printed on the respective field. If the option was not
requested, an N is printed. For example, an N/Y in this field means that the
window-scaling option was not specified, while the Time-stamp option was
specified in the SYN segment. (client (a) to server (b))

68

req 1323 ts b a

. . .

69

adv wind scale a b

The window scaling factor used. Again, this field is valid only if the connection
was captured fully to include the SYN packets. Since the connection would
use window scaling if and only if both sides requested window scaling [8], this
field is reset to 0 (even if a window scale was requested in the SYN packet for
this direction), if the SYN packet in the reverse direction did not carry the
window scale option. (client (a) to server (b))

B-3

Number

Short

70

adv wind scale b a

71

req sack a b

Long
(server (b) to client (a))
If the end-point sent a SACK permitted option in the SYN packet opening
the connection, a Y is printed; otherwise N is printed. (client (a) to server
(b))

72

req sack b a

73

sacks sent a b

(server (b) to client (a))
The total number of ACK packets seen carrying SACK information. (client
(a) to server (b))

74

sacks sent b a

75

urgent data pkts a b

(server (b) to client (a))
The total number of packets with the URG bit turned on in the TCP header.
(client (a) to server (b))

76

urgent data pkts b a

77

urgent data bytes a b

(server (b) to client (a))
The total bytes of urgent data sent. This field is calculated by summing the
urgent pointer offset values found in packets having the URG bit set in the
TCP header. (client (a) to server (b))

78

urgent data bytes b a

79

mss requested a b

80

mss requested b a

81

max segm size a b

82

max segm size b a

83

min segm size a b

(server (b) to client (a))
The Maximum Segment Size (MSS) requested as a TCP option in the SYN
packet opening the connection. (client (a) to server (b))
(server (b) to client (a))
The maximum segment size observed during the lifetime of the connection.
(client (a) to server (b))
(server (b) to client (a))
The minimum segment size observed during the lifetime of the connection.
(client (a) to server (b))

84

min segm size b a

85

avg segm size a b

(server (b) to client (a))
The average segment size observed during the lifetime of the connection calculated as the value reported in the actual data bytes field divided by the
actual data pkts reported. (client (a) to server (b))

86

avg segm size b a

87

max win adv a b

(server (b) to client (a))
The maximum window advertisement seen. If the connection is using window scaling (both sides negotiated window scaling during the opening of the
connection), this is the maximum window-scaled advertisement seen in the
connection. For a connection using window scaling, both the SYN segments
opening the connection have to be captured in the dumpfile for this and the
following window statistics to be accurate. (client (a) to server (b))

B-4

Number

Short

88

max win adv b a

89

min win adv a b

Long
(server (b) to client (a))
The minimum window advertisement seen. This is the minimum windowscaled advertisement seen if both sides negotiated window scaling. (client (a)
to server (b))

90

min win adv b a

91

zero win adv a b

(server (b) to client (a))
The number of times a zero receive window was advertised. (client (a) to
server (b))

92

zero win adv b a

93

avg win adv a b

(server (b) to client (a))
The average window advertisement seen, calculated as the sum of all window
advertisements divided by the total number of packets seen. If the connection
endpoints negotiated window scaling, this average is calculated as the sum
of all window-scaled advertisements divided by the number of window-scaled
packets seen. Note that in the window-scaled case, the window advertisements
in the SYN packets are excluded since the SYN packets themselves cannot
have their window advertisements scaled, as per RFC 1323 [8]. (client (a) to
server (b))

94

avg win adv b a

95

initial window-bytes a b

(server (b) to client (a))
The total number of bytes sent in the initial window i.e., the number of bytes
seen in the initial flight of data before receiving the first ack packet from the
other endpoint. Note that the ack packet from the other endpoint is the first
ack acknowledging some data (the ACKs part of the 3-way handshake do not
count), and any retransmitted packets in this stage are excluded. (client (a)
to server (b))

96

initial window-bytes b a

97

initial window-packets a

The total number of segments (packets) sent in the initial window as explained

b

above. (client (a) to server (b))

98

initial window-packets b

(server (b) to client (a))

(server (b) to client (a))

a
99

ttl stream length a b

The Theoretical Stream Length. This is calculated as the difference between
the sequence numbers of the SYN and FIN packets, giving the length of the
data stream seen. Note that this calculation is aware of sequence space wraparounds, and is printed only if the connection was complete (both the SYN
and FIN packets were seen). (client (a) to server (b))

100

ttl stream length b a

101

missed data a b

(server (b) to client (a))
The missed data, calculated as the difference between the ttl stream length
and unique bytes sent. If the connection was not complete, this calculation
is invalid and an NA (Not Available) is printed. (client (a) to server (b))

B-5

Number

Short

102

missed data b a

103

truncated data a b

Long
(server (b) to client (a))
The truncated data, calculated as the total bytes of data truncated during
packet capture. For example, with tcpdump, the snaplen option can be set
to 64 (with NAME? option) so that just the headers of the packet (assuming
there are no options) are captured, truncating most of the packet data. In an
Ethernet with maximum segment size of 1500 bytes, this would amount to
truncated data of 1500 64 = 1436bytes for a packet. (client (a) to server (b))

104

truncated data b a

105

truncated packets a b

(server (b) to client (a))
The total number of packets truncated as explained above. (client (a) to
server (b))

106

truncated packets b a

107

data xmit time a b

(server (b) to client (a))
Total data transmit time, calculated as the difference between the times of
capture of the first and last packets carrying non-zero TCP data payload.
(client (a) to server (b))

108

data xmit time b a

109

idletime max a b

110

idletime max b a

111

throughput a b

(server (b) to client (a))
Maximum idle time, calculated as the maximum time between consecutive
packets seen in the direction. (client (a) to server (b))
(server (b) to client (a))
The average throughput calculated as the unique bytes sent divided by the
elapsed time i.e., the value reported in the unique bytes sent field divided by
the elapsed time (the time difference between the capture of the first and last
packets in the direction). (client (a) to server (b))

112

throughput b a

113

RTT samples a b

(server (b) to client (a))
The total number of Round-Trip Time (RTT) samples found. tcptrace is
pretty smart about choosing only valid RTT samples. An RTT sample is
found only if an ack packet is received from the other endpoint for a previously
transmitted packet such that the acknowledgment value is 1 greater than
the last sequence number of the packet. Further, it is required that the
packet being acknowledged was not retransmitted, and that no packets that
came before it in the sequence space were retransmitted after the packet was
transmitted. Note : The former condition invalidates RTT samples due to the
retransmission ambiguity problem, and the latter condition invalidates RTT
samples since it could be the case that the ack packet could be cumulatively
acknowledging the retransmitted packet, and not necessarily acking the packet
in question. (client (a) to server (b))
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Number

Short

114

RTT samples b a

115

RTT min a b

116

RTT min b a

117

RTT max a b

118

RTT max b a

119

RTT avg a b

Long
(server (b) to client (a))
The minimum RTT sample seen. (client (a) to server (b))
(server (b) to client (a))
The maximum RTT sample seen. (client (a) to server (b))
(server (b) to client (a))
The average value of RTT found, calculated straightforwardly as the sum of
all the RTT values found divided by the total number of RTT samples. (client
(a) to server (b))

120

RTT avg b a

121

RTT stdv a b

122

RTT stdv b a

123

RTT from 3WHS a b

(server (b) to client (a))
The standard deviation of the RTT samples. (client (a) to server (b))
(server (b) to client (a))
The RTT value calculated from the TCP 3-Way Hand-Shake (connection
opening) [9], assuming that the SYN packets of the connection were captured.
(client (a) to server (b))

124

RTT from 3WHS b a

125

RTT full sz smpls a b

(server (b) to client (a))
The total number of full-size RTT samples, calculated from the RTT samples
of full-size segments. Full-size segments are defined to be the segments of the
largest size seen in the connection. (client (a) to server (b))

126

RTT full sz smpls b a

127

RTT full sz min a b

128

RTT full sz min b a

129

RTT full sz max a b

130

RTT full sz max b a

131

RTT full sz avg a b

132

RTT full sz avg b a

133

RTT full sz stdev a b

134

RTT full sz stdev b a

135

post-loss acks a b

(server (b) to client (a))
The minimum full-size RTT sample. (client (a) to server (b))
(server (b) to client (a))
The maximum full-size RTT sample. (client (a) to server (b))
(server (b) to client (a))
The average full-size RTT sample. (client (a) to server (b))
(server (b) to client (a))
The standard deviation of full-size RTT samples. (client (a) to server (b))
(server (b) to client (a))
The total number of ack packets received after losses were detected and a
retransmission occurred. More precisely, a post-loss ack is found to occur
when an ack packet acknowledges a packet sent (acknowledgment value in
the ack pkt is 1 greater than the packets last sequence number), and at least
one packet occurring before the packet acknowledged, was retransmitted later.
In other words, the ack packet is received after we observed a (perceived) loss
event and are recovering from it. (client (a) to server (b))
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Number

Short

136

post-loss acks b a

137

segs cum acked a b

Long
(server (b) to client (a))
The count of the number of segments that were cumulatively acknowledged
and not directly acknowledged. (client (a) to server (b))

138

segs cum acked b a

139

duplicate acks a b

140

duplicate acks b a

141

triple dupacks a b

(server (b) to client (a))
The total number of duplicate acknowledgments received. (client (a) to server
(b))
(server (b) to client (a))
The total number of triple duplicate acknowledgments received (three duplicate acknowledgments acknowledging the same segment), a condition commonly used to trigger the fast-retransmit/fast-recovery phase of TCP. (client
(a) to server (b))

142

triple dupacks b a

143

max # retrans a b

(server (b) to client (a))
The maximum number of retransmissions seen for any segment during the
lifetime of the connection. (client (a) to server (b))

144

max # retrans b a

145

min retr time a b

146

min retr time b a

147

max retr time a b

148

max retr time b a

149

avg retr time a b

(server (b) to client (a))
The minimum time seen between any two (re)transmissions of a segment
amongst all the retransmissions seen. (client (a) to server (b))
(server (b) to client (a))
The maximum time seen between any two (re)transmissions of a segment.
(client (a) to server (b))
(server (b) to client (a))
The average time seen between any two (re)transmissions of a segment calculated from all the retransmissions. (client (a) to server (b))

150

avg retr time b a

151

sdv retr time a b

(server (b) to client (a))

152

sdv retr time b a

153

min data wire a b

Minimum number of bytes in (Ethernet) packet (client (a) to server (b))

154

q1 data wire a b

First quartile of bytes in (Ethernet) packet

155

med data wire a b

Median of bytes in (Ethernet) packet

156

mean data wire a b

Mean of bytes in (Ethernet) packet

157

q3 data wire a b

Third quartile of bytes in (Ethernet) packet

158

max data wire a b

Maximum of bytes in (Ethernet) packet

159

var data wire a b

Variance of bytes in (Ethernet) packet

160

min data ip a b

Minimum number of total bytes in IP packet

161

q1 data ip a b

First quartile of total bytes in IP packet

162

med data ip a b

Median of total bytes in IP packet

163

mean data ip a b

Mean of total bytes in IP packet

The standard deviation of the retransmission-time samples obtained from all
the retransmissions. (client (a) to server (b))
(server (b) to client (a))
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Number

Short

Long

164

q3 data ip a b

Third quartile of total bytes in IP packet

165

max data ip a b

Maximum of total bytes in IP packet

166

var data ip a b

Variance of total bytes in IP packet

167

min data control a b

Minimum of control bytes in packet

168

q1 data control a b

First quartile of control bytes in packet

169

med data control a b

Median of control bytes in packet

170

mean data control a b

Mean of control bytes in packet

171

q3 data control a b

Third quartile of control bytes in packet

172

max data control a b

Maximum of control bytes in packet

173

var data control a b

Variance of control bytes packet

174

min data wire b a

Minimum number of bytes in (Ethernet) packet (server (b) to client (a))

175

q1 data wire b a

First quartile of bytes in (Ethernet) packet

176

med data wire b a

Median of bytes in (Ethernet) packet

177

mean data wire b a

Mean of bytes in (Ethernet) packet

178

q3 data wire b a

Third quartile of bytes in (Ethernet) packet

179

max data wire b a

Maximum of bytes in (Ethernet) packet

180

var data wire b a

Variance of bytes in (Ethernet) packet

181

min data ip b a

Minimum number of total bytes in IP packet

182

q1 data ip b a

First quartile of total bytes in IP packet

183

med data ip b a

Median of total bytes in IP packet

184

mean data ip b a

Mean of total bytes in IP packet

185

q3 data ip b a

Third quartile of total bytes in IP packet

186

max data ip b a

Maximum of total bytes in IP packet

187

var data ip b a

Variance of total bytes in IP packet

188

min data control b a

Minimum of control bytes in packet

189

q1 data control b a

First quartile of control bytes in packet

190

med data control b a

Median of control bytes in packet

191

mean data control b a

Mean of control bytes in packet

192

q3 data control b a

Third quartile of control bytes in packet

193

max data control b a

Maximum of control bytes in packet

194

var data control b a

Variance of control bytes packet

195

min IAT a b

Minimum of packet inter-arrival time (client (a) to server (b))

196

q1 IAT a b

First quartile of packet inter-arrival time

197

med IAT a b

Median of packet inter-arrival time

198

mean IAT a b

Mean of packet inter-arrival time
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Number

Short

Long

199

q3 IAT a b

Third quartile of packet inter-arrival time

200

max IAT a b

Maximum of packet inter-arrival time

201

var IAT a b

Variance of packet inter-arrival time

202

min IAT b a

Minimum of packet inter-arrival time (server (b) to client (a))

203

q1 IAT b a

First quartile of packet inter-arrival time

204

med IAT b a

Median of packet inter-arrival time

205

mean IAT b a

Mean of packet inter-arrival time

206

q3 IAT b a

Third quartile of packet inter-arrival time

207

max IAT b a

Maximum of packet inter-arrival time

208

var IAT b a

Variance of packet inter-arrival time

209

Time since last connec-

Time since the last connection between these hosts

tion
210

No.

transitions bulk/-

trans

The number of transitions between transaction mode and bulk transfer mode,
where bulk transfer mode is defined as the time when there are more than
three successive packets in the same direction without any packets carrying
data in the other direction

211

Time spent in bulk

Amount of time spent in bulk transfer mode

212

Duration

Connection duration

213

% bulk

Percent of time spent in bulk transfer

214

Time spent idle

The time spent idle (where idle time is the accumulation of all periods of 2
seconds or greater when no packet was seen in either direction)

215

% idle

Percent of time spent idle

216

Effective Bandwidth

Effective Bandwidth based upon entropy [10] (both directions)

217

Effective Bandwidth a b

(client (a) to server (b))

218

Effective Bandwidth b a

(server (b) to client (a))

219

FFT all

FFT of packet IAT (arctan of the top-ten frequencies ranked by the magnitude
of their contribution) (all traffic) (Frequency #1)

220

FFT all

(Frequency #2)

221

FFT all

.. .

222

FFT all

.. .

223

FFT all

.. .

224

FFT all

.. .

225

FFT all

.. .

226

FFT all

.. .

227

FFT all

.. .

228

FFT all

(Frequency #10)

229

FFT a b

FFT of packet IAT (arctan of the top-ten frequencies ranked by the magnitude
of their contribution) (client (a) to server (b)) (Frequency #1)
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Number

Short

Long

230

FFT a b

(Frequency #2)

231

FFT a b

.. .

232

FFT a b

.. .

233

FFT a b

.. .

234

FFT a b

.. .

235

FFT a b

.. .

236

FFT a b

.. .

237

FFT a b

.. .

238

FFT b a

239

FFT b a

240

FFT b a

(Frequency #2)

241

FFT b a

.. .

242

FFT b a

.. .

243

FFT b a

.. .

244

FFT b a

.. .

245

FFT b a

.. .

246

FFT b a

.. .

247

FFT b a

.. .

248

FFT b a

249

Classes

(Frequency #10)
FFT of packet IAT (arctan of the top-ten frequencies ranked by the magnitude
of their contribution) (server (b) to client (a)) (Frequency #1)

(Frequency # 10)
Application class, as assigned in [1]
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